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PROTECTING PRIVACY TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION
JESSICA L. ROBERTS*
ABSTRACT
A person cannot consider information that she does not have.
Unlawful discrimination, therefore, frequently requires discrimina-
tors to have knowledge about protected status. This Article exploits
that simple reality, arguing that protecting privacy can prevent
discrimination by restricting access to the very information discrimi-
nators use to discriminate. Although information related to many
antidiscrimination categories, like race and sex, may be immediately
apparent upon meeting a person, privacy law can still do significant
work to prevent discrimination on the basis of less visible traits such
as genetic information, age, national origin, ethnicity, and religion,
as well as in cases of racial or gender ambiguity. To that end, this
Article explores the advantages and disadvantages of enacting
privacy protections to thwart discrimination. It concludes that the
weaknesses endemic to privacy law might be addressed by adopting
an explicit antidiscrimination purpose. Hence, just as privacy law
may further antidiscrimination, so may antidiscrimination enhance
privacy law.
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INTRODUCTION
A young woman working at a sporting goods store was demoted
following her boss’s discovery that she self-identified as black.1 A
bank terminated a recent hire, whom it had recruited aggressively,
when human resources found out she was over sixty-five years old.2
A man was fired from a financial institution after his supervisor
learned he was of Iranian descent.3 A medical clinic withdrew a
woman’s job offer when personnel documents revealed she had been
born a man.4 And a married couple teaching in a public school
system faced discrimination after the district discovered they were
Jehovah’s Witnesses.5 These cases share a common theme. In each
of them, the employer obtained previously unknown information
about the employee, which opened the door for subsequent discrimi-
nation.
These examples reveal that in certain circumstances, discrimina-
tors need information to discriminate. To discriminate on the basis
of national origin or religion, an employer must first have some
knowledge of an employee’s roots or beliefs. Now imagine a world in
which employers could not ask about the protected statuses of their
employees. It would be markedly more challenging—perhaps even
impossible—for an employer to base conscious or unconscious de-
cisions on the employee’s national origin or religion, simply because
the employer has less information. The same holds true for other
antidiscrimination categories such as genetic information, age,
ethnicity, disability, and, at times, even race and sex. Restricting
1. Mitchell v. Champ Sports, 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 645 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
2. Rubel v. Century Bancshares, Inc., No. Civ.02-482(MJD/JGL), 2004 WL 114942, at *1-
2 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2004).
3. See Entry of Final Judgment, Zojaji v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No.
1:07-cv-22134-ASG (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2007); Kevin Burke, Ex-Merrill Broker Wins $1.6
Million in Rare Arbitration Award, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (July 23, 2007), http://wealth
management.com/securities-law/ex-merrill-broker-wins-16-million-rare-arbitration-award
[http://perma.cc/SJ2R-C792]; Trita Parsi, EEOC: Merrill Lynch Hired Iranian for His Brains,
Fired Him for His Nationality, NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL (July 3, 2007), http://www.
niacouncil.org/eeoc-merrill-lynch-hired-iranian-for-his-brains-fired-him-for-his-nationality/
[http://perma.cc/CS8Q-J7X8].
4. Lopez v. River Oaks Diagnostic & Imaging Grp., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655-56 (S.D.
Tex. 2008).
5. Rosales v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cnty., No. 2:12-CV-00454-JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. 2012).
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potential discriminators’ access to information about protected sta-
tus can significantly reduce the chances of subsequent discrimina-
tion. In addition to supporting ordinary bans on adverse differential
conduct, antidiscrimination advocates could also endorse privacy
protections crafted to limit access to information about protected
statuses.6 
Yet despite this connection between information and action,
lawmakers and commentators often treat privacy and antidis-
crimination as separate, unrelated spheres of law. Privacy/anti-
discrimination essentialism proceeds as follows: Laws governing
privacy seek to protect individuals from unwanted invasions into
their personal lives. Those legal safeguards usually operate either
by restricting the circumstances of valid disclosures or by prohibit-
ing inquiries by certain kinds of third parties.7 Because decisions
related to who may obtain private information and under what
circumstances should be a matter of individual control, the underly-
ing norm behind these protections has frequently been identified as
autonomy—the ability to make choices about one’s self and well-
being free from the intrusions of others.8 By contrast, antidiscrimi-
nation laws attempt to stop disadvantage on the basis of protected
status, frequently through prohibiting the covered decision makers
from considering that status when making particular types of de-
terminations.9 Antidiscrimination legislation is thus animated by
distinct concerns of equality and fairness.10 The apparent differences
in the underlying norms, legislative purposes, and structures of
these protections have frequently led lawmakers, commentators,
and scholars to regard statutes designed to protect privacy and
6. I use the term “protected status” broadly to encompass all antidiscrimination criteria.
For example, sex and race are protected statuses under Title VII, disability is a protected
status under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), age is a protected status under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and so forth.
7. See infra Part I.A.1 (explaining the legislative purpose and structure of legal
protections associated with privacy law).
8. See infra Part I.A.1 (identifying autonomy as the underlying norm at stake within
privacy law).
9. See infra Part I.A.2 (explaining the legislative purpose and structure of legal protec-
tions associated with antidiscrimination law).
10. See infra Part I.A.2 (identifying equality and fairness as the underlying norms at
stake within antidiscrimination law). 
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statutes designed to stop discrimination as occupying different
domains.
This Article rejects that view, and instead shows that these
fields operate symbiotically rather than separately. In particular,
it argues that privacy law can do the work of antidiscrimination.
Conceptually, the norms of privacy and antidiscrimination are in-
extricably related as both deal with restrictions on certain kinds of
information.11 By consequence, legal protections that at first blush
appear geared solely to further the purpose and norms more readily
associated with privacy can likewise further the purpose and norms
of antidiscrimination. Privacy protections can prevent access to the
very information that discriminators may use to discriminate, act-
ing as a bulwark against harmful differential conduct. Privacy
constitutes an exciting yet largely unexplored means to combat
discrimination in cases in which the potential discriminator lacks
knowledge related to a given protected status.
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) provides
a useful example of the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis.12 The
statute prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, or purchas-
ing genetic information, in addition to its proscription on discrim-
inatory conduct.13 Instead of accepting the view that GINA’s privacy
and antidiscrimination protections are separate, I assert that
violations of genetic privacy can be understood in explicitly antidis-
crimination terms.14 Viewed from this vantage, GINA’s privacy
provision is not separate from, but rather part of GINA’s antidis-
crimination mandate. This observation not only illuminates Con-
gress’s intent in passing GINA but also provides champions of civil
rights with a real-world example of how privacy protections have
the power to stop discrimination. Taking a cue from GINA, this
Article then explores how privacy law might create an added level
of protection against discrimination in contexts beyond genetic
information when the potential discriminator does not have access
to the relevant information.
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.
12. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
13.  Id.
14. See infra Part II.B.
2102 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2097
Privacy law offers some clear benefits as a mechanism for
undermining discrimination. Whereas claims of discrimination may
require claimants to meet the challenging burden of establishing the
mental state of their alleged discriminators, privacy law requires
only a showing that the covered entity inappropriately obtained, or
attempted to obtain, the protected information.15 Protecting privacy
is also advantageous because it operates at an earlier stage in the
process of discrimination.16 Antidiscrimination law prohibits dis-
criminatory actions by outlawing certain types of conduct, but pri-
vacy law renders the offensive conduct practically impossible by
impeding access to the information necessary for the unfavorable
differentiation. Hence, privacy law could at times be a more effective
tool for combating discrimination than typical antidiscrimination
protections.
Despite its clear advantages, privacy law also presents notable
drawbacks as a vehicle for stopping discriminators. First, strong
privacy protections or norms may impede useful disclosures.17
Robust privacy protections or their accompanying values could
encourage individuals to conceal information related to protected
status, even in cases when disclosure could be beneficial personally
(for example, necessary for affirmative action or accommodation) or
socially (for example, consciousness raising). Beyond silencing po-
tentially beneficial disclosures, privacy law faces other practical
impediments as an antidiscrimination instrument. In particular,
because invasions of privacy constitute a dignitary harm, legislators
and judges may hesitate to provide relief for those violations absent
some other bad effect.18 Yet in these circumstances, antidiscrimina-
tion can also assist privacy. 
Recognizing that privacy law can preempt future wrongdoing
could make lawmakers, who are reluctant to protect against purely
dignitary harms, more amenable to safeguarding sensitive infor-
mation. Consequently, legislators may be more likely to draft, and
judges more likely to enforce, a privacy protection when it is teth-
ered to an antidiscrimination initiative, as in the case of GINA.
15. See infra Part III.B.1.
16. See infra Part III.B.2.
17. See infra Part III.C.1.
18. See infra Part III.C.2.
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Antidiscrimination could thus further privacy by creating incentives
to share protected information when it could have a beneficial
impact, and by providing an additional justification for legal inter-
vention. Antidiscrimination could, as a result, mitigate concerns
associated with privacy law, such as undesirable silencing and the
absence of a tangible harm.
Although other scholars have touched upon the privacy/antidis-
crimination symbiosis to prevent genetic-information discrimina-
tion, relatively little has been written on this potentially powerful
synergy in other areas. This Article is the first to systematically
apply the concept of protecting privacy to prevent discrimination
outside the contexts of genetic information and disability. It makes
three central contributions. Part I identifies and dismantles priva-
cy/antidiscrimination essentialism by introducing the privacy/anti-
discrimination symbiosis. Part II identifies GINA as a real-world
example of the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis, asserting that
Congress intended to invoke privacy law to further antidiscrim-
ination goals when it drafted the statute. Finally, Part III weighs
the benefits and drawbacks of using privacy law to preempt discrim-
ination, not only for genetic information, but also for other antidis-
crimination categories when information related to protected status
is unknown to the discriminator.
This Article demonstrates that the symbiosis between privacy and
antidiscrimination works both ways. Just as privacy can promote
antidiscrimination, antidiscrimination can promote privacy, leading
to more comprehensive overall protection. Lawmakers could thus
use privacy law as a novel, additional tool in the antidiscrimination
toolbox—and vice versa.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PRIVACY/ANTIDISCRIMINATION SYMBIOSIS
Privacy law and antidiscrimination law are frequently construed
as distinct kinds of legal protections: one meant to protect sensitive
information, and the other meant to prevent disadvantage on the
basis of protected status. But that perspective is not the only way
to view the relationship between privacy and antidiscrimination.
This Part outlines the essentialist view that privacy law and
antidiscrimination law are distinct. It then follows with a deeper
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exploration of the normative connection between privacy and anti-
discrimination. Lastly, Part I proposes that privacy laws can be
understood in decidedly antidiscrimination terms, a phenomenon I
call the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis.
A. Privacy/Antidiscrimination Essentialism
When drafting statutes, legislatures have distinguished between
the goal of promoting privacy and the goal of preventing discrimina-
tion. To understand privacy/antidiscrimination essentialism, one
must first be familiar with three concepts related to law making:
(1) underlying norms, (2) legislative purpose, and (3) types of legal
protection. Because privacy law and antidiscrimination law are typ-
ically understood to differ across every one of these three metrics,
lawmakers may regard them as separate and distinct types of legis-
lation.19
1. Privacy
Let us begin with privacy. Privacy can mean many things.20 Peo-
ple may allege that any number of diverse actions or events violate
their privacy, including releasing personal information to unauth-
orized third parties or the press, breaking into a person’s home to
observe and record her actions, or using technologies such as ther-
mal imaging or X-ray without previous consent.21 In fact, some
scholars have argued that privacy is such an amorphous and un-
wieldy concept that it is effectively devoid of meaning.22 Although a
19. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, What Is in GINA’s Genes? The Curious Case of the
Mutant-Hybrid Employment Law, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2011); Pauline Kim, Genetic
Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections for a Brave New Workplace,
96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1543 (2002). 
20. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein & Mary R. Anderlik, What is Genetic Discrimination, and
When and How Can It Be Prevented?, 3 GENETICS MED. 354, 355 (2001); Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 485-86 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy
of Privacy]; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088-89 (2002)
[hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy].
21. I based this list on the examples from Daniel Solove’s outstanding article. See Solove,
A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 481.
22. See Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001); see also
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 479-80 (cataloging scholarly frustration
with the ambiguity surrounding privacy); Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 20,
2015] PROTECTING PRIVACY TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION 2105
unified concept of privacy may remain elusive, certain situations
nonetheless are widely assumed to implicate the thing we call
“privacy.”23 
As a general matter, privacy centers on the notion that we are
entitled to a certain amount of control over our bodies, our environ-
ments, and—most importantly for the purposes of this Arti-
cle—information about ourselves. In general, privacy can be thought
of as “the condition of being protected from unwanted access by
others.”24 More specifically, one can understand informational pri-
vacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to deter-
mine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others,”25 or simply “control over
knowledge about oneself.”26 Although this definition does not
capture all possible iterations of privacy as a concept, it is useful in
the context of this Article, which deals exclusively with access to
personal information, namely information related to antidiscrim-
ination categories. 
Insofar as privacy is construed as a matter of control, its pri-
mary underlying norm is autonomy.27 Autonomy holds that a person
at 1088-90 (presenting an inventory of scholarly unease with respect to the meaning of
privacy).
23. Daniel Solove identifies four types of harmful activities associated with privacy
violations: “(1) information collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissem-
ination, and (4) invasion.” Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 489.
24. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 10-11
(1982).
25. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also Elizabeth L. Beardsley,
Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in PRIVACY 56, 65 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1971). These definitions deal with information. The value of privacy can be
further broken down into a variety of categories, including informational, physical, decisional,
and proprietary aspects. Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 33-34
(Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997). Although informational privacy will also cover the use of
private information, mere information collection, regardless if it is ever processed or dis-
seminated, can violate privacy and thus be harmful. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra
note 20, at 489.
26. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968); see also Hyman Gross, Privacy
and Autonomy, in PRIVACY, supra note 25, at 169, 171; Andrei Marmor, What Is the Right to
Privacy? (USC Gould Sch. of Law Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Legal Studies Research Papers
Series No. 14-13, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/2T8Z-TCMG.
27. See, e.g., 1 L. CAMILLE HÉBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 1:4 (2007 & Supp. 2013)
(“The right to privacy is about autonomy—allowing individuals to make their own choices
about fundamental aspects of their lives.”); WESTIN, supra note 25, at 20 (identifying attempts
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should have the freedom and the capacity to make decisions that
impact her life, unconstrained by the preferences or idiosyncrasies
of others.28 Privacy, therefore, advances autonomy by allowing us to
maintain primary decision-making authority across the varying
spheres of our lives.29 Informational privacy is not so much about
the nature of the information itself, but rather how third parties
acquire that information.30
Protecting privacy allows us to more freely construct our identi-
ties and negotiate our social interactions. Being able to keep some
things private is essential to living communally.31 To allow free
access to everything about our lives would erode our sense of self
and undermine our differentiation from those around us.32 In the
context of communal living, personal autonomy is compromised
not only when an individual feels compelled to answer an intru-
sive question, but also when she fears that the response could be
to guard and control autonomy as one of the central efforts of privacy law); Beardsley, supra
note 25, at 70 (identifying selective disclosure as “the conceptual core of the norm of privacy”
and autonomy as the foundation for the moral obligation of selective disclosure); Gross, supra
note 26, at 181 (explaining that “while an offense to privacy is an offense to autonomy, not
every curtailment of autonomy is a compromise of privacy”); Marmor, supra note 26, at 7
(describing privacy as “an autonomy-based interest”); see also Corbett, supra note 19, at 9
(asserting that “[p]rivacy is a complicated concept and includes interests such as secrecy of
information and autonomy”); Kim, supra note 19, at 1537 (identifying autonomy as the norm
behind legal protections of privacy). But see Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89
YALE L.J. 421, 423, 426 (1980) (asserting that the privacy interest is related to “our
accessibility to others” but rejecting “privacy as a form of control”); Marmor, supra note 26,
at 18 (“If you equate the right to privacy with the right to personal autonomy, you just admit
that there is no particular interest in privacy that is worthy of protection, distinct from the
much broader and, admittedly, more important, right to personal autonomy.”). See generally
Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination
Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 616 (2011); David Orentlicher, Genetic Privacy in the
Patient-Physician Relationship, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDEN-
TIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra note 25, at 77.
28. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining “autonomy” as “liberty to
follow one’s will, personal freedom”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 154 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “autonomy” as “[a]n individual's capacity for self-determination”).
29. BOK, supra note 24, at 20. Reciprocally, autonomy supports privacy by allowing
individuals to make choices about disclosure. Being forced to disclose thus violates an
individual’s privacy by undermining her autonomy. One kind of harmful act associated with
information collection is interrogation. For a discussion of interrogation as a privacy-related
harmful act, see Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 499-505.
30. Marmor, supra note 26, at 1.
31. BOK, supra note 24, at 20; Marmor, supra note 26, at 17.
32. BOK, supra note 24, at 20. 
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disseminated without her consent.33 Thus, perhaps counter-intu-
itively, privacy is essential to our relationships.34 What we reveal to
an employer will differ from what we reveal to a family member,
which will likewise differ from what we reveal to a lover.35 Privacy
is consequently viewed as an indispensable aspect of our most
fundamental liberties and worthy of protection.36
Laws designed to safeguard informational privacy prevent un-
authorized access to the protected information, restricting the cir-
cumstances under which third parties may either seek or disclose
private information. The legal protections associated with informa-
tional privacy law can thereby be further subdivided into two kinds
of protections: (1) source-based, and (2) recipient-based.
The Privacy Act of 1974, which applies to federal agencies, gov-
erns the proper collection, maintenance, usage, and disclosure of re-
cords containing personally identifiable information.37 The relevant
subsection provides: “No agency shall disclose any record which is
contained in a system of records by any means of communication to
any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to
whom the record pertains.”38 The Privacy Act exemplifies a source-
based privacy protection. It restricts the ability of the information
holder (federal agencies) to share or disseminate the protected
information.
Conversely, the Employer Use of Social Media Act, a California
state law that went into effect at the beginning of 2012, governs an
employer’s ability to obtain information related to its employees’
activities on social media.39 The law states:
33. For a discussion of the harms associated with dissemination, see Solove, A Taxonomy
of Privacy, supra note 20, at 525-52.
34. Fried, supra note 26, at 477; Marmor, supra note 26, at 5.
35. See Fried, supra note 26, at 490; Marmor, supra note 26, at 5; Orentlicher, supra note
27, at 79.
36. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic
Discrimination, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1341, 1353 (2002). As some scholars have explained,
“Although we live in a world of noisy self-confession, privacy allows us to keep certain facts
to ourselves if we so choose. The right to privacy, it seems, is what makes us civilized.” ELLEN
ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, at xiii (1995).
37. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
38. Id. § 552a(b).
39. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2014).
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An employer shall not require or request an employee or appli-
cant for employment to do any of the following:
(1) Disclose a username or password for the purpose of
accessing personal social media.
(2) Access personal social media in the presence of the
employer.
(3) Divulge any personal social media, except as provided
in subdivision (c).40
Eleven states have passed legislation restricting an employer’s
ability to access its employees’ social media accounts.41 These laws
are recipient-based because they prohibit certain kinds of third par-
ties (employers) who wish to receive the protected information from
attempting to acquire it. In other words, they prevent the privacy
harm of interrogation.42
In addition to forbidding violations by information holders or
potential recipients, privacy laws also frequently outline the appro-
priate conditions or processes for information sharing, such as con-
fidentiality policies and disclosure agreements. For instance, the
Privacy Act forbids the disclosure of protected information absent
the written consent of the subject unless the disclosure falls within
the statute’s twelve enumerated exceptions.43 Likewise, the Em-
ployer Use of Social Media Act allows an employer to seek infor-
mation related to an employee’s personal social media when that
40. Id. § 980(b).
41. Among the states that regulate employer access to social media are Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington. Philip L. Gordon & Joon Hwang, Making Sense of the Complex Patchwork
Created by Nearly One Dozen New Social Media Password Protection Laws, 51 Gov’t Emp. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) No. 2511, at 1030 (July 30, 2013); see also Joseph J. Lazzarotti, More States Limit
Employer Access to Employee Social Media Accounts, JACKSONLEWIS (May 23, 2013),
http://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/2013/05/articles/workplace-invstigations/more-states-
limit-employer-access-to-employee-social-media-accounts [http://perma.cc/B9BA-YJ2V].
42. The harm of interrogation occurs when a person feels obligated to answer an invasive
or offensive question out of the fear that her failure to respond will raise negative inferences.
I will discuss the possibility that the failure to respond results in an inference that the person
has done something shameful. See infra notes 320-28 and accompanying text.
43. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12).
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information pertains to misconduct.44 Privacy laws thus contain
both negative and positive constraints.
2. Antidiscrimination
Now let us proceed to antidiscrimination. In contrast to privacy,
what constitutes an antidiscrimination harm is more easily
identifiable. On a basic level, to discriminate simply means to
differentiate.45 Consequently, a person theoretically discriminates
whenever she treats one individual differently from another. That
is the value-neutral definition of discrimination. But discrimination
also has a non-neutral, normative definition, which is how the term
is most often used in law.46 In this context, discrimination is the
subset of differentiation that has been judged morally “wrong.”47
Significantly, this wrongful differentiation need not be intentional,
such as in the case of disparate impact actions or barriers to access
for people with disabilities.48 For example, although no one may
have explicitly intended that height requirements or stairs would
disproportionately exclude women or people with disabilities, re-
spectively, these structural barriers lead to differentiation that
contributes to social disadvantage. There is nothing inherently un-
just about height requirements or stairs; however, because these
policies and structures produce unwanted differentiation, we can
understand them as agents of discrimination. Regardless of intent,
when given a normative overlay, discrimination refers to socially
undesirable differentiation. Discrimination is then by its very defi-
nition (at least in the legal context) unfair.
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(c) (“Nothing in this section shall affect an employer’s existing
rights and obligations to request an employee to divulge personal social media reasonably
believed to be relevant to an investigation of allegations of employee misconduct or employee
violation of applicable laws and regulations, provided that the social media is used solely for
purposes of that investigation or a related proceeding.”).
45. See ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY: A MORAL
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 11 (1980) (stating that the dictionary meaning of “discrimination” is
“morally neutral”).
46. Id. (explaining the political meaning of “discrimination” is “non-neutral, pejorative”
and that simply calling a practice “discriminatory” may be sufficient for some people “to judge
it wrong”).
47. Id.
48. See id.
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Although the wrong at stake with discrimination (that is, the dep-
rivation of social benefits, such as employment, through harmful
differentiation) may be clearer than the intangible wrongs associ-
ated with privacy, exactly what makes one type of differentiation
problematic and another permissible is not always clear. For ex-
ample, if an employer chooses only to promote graduates of the
University of Southern California (USC), that employer is differenti-
ating on the basis of educational institution. Even though many
people, including UCLA graduates, might find such a practice arbi-
trary or even irrational, it would nonetheless be socially acceptable,
at least to some degree. But why? To start, employers almost always
consider the education of their employees. Additionally, non-USC
graduates have not faced widespread systematic disadvantage, so
one employer’s policy, though idiosyncratic, would not be socially
damaging. Hence, it may not be enough for even irrational differen-
tiation to be considered “discriminatory.” 
So if the arbitrary, irrational, or idiosyncratic nature of the
differentiation is not enough to make it discriminatory, which kinds
of differentiation are so problematic that the law intervenes to stop
them? Often the determination of whether a practice is discrimina-
tory in the pejorative sense turns on whether the conduct in ques-
tion leads to disadvantage on the basis of a characteristic that either
has personal or social relevance, or has been the basis for systematic
social subjugation in the past.49 Traditional antidiscrimination ca-
tegories include race and ethnicity, sex, religion, age, and disabil-
ity.50 Antidiscrimination laws communicate the message that society
does not wish to distribute its benefits and burdens on the basis of
a particular protected status because of the significance of that
status.
The unwillingness to allow decision makers to consider certain
information, as expressed in laws prohibiting discrimination, can be
traced to the norms of fairness and equality, respectively. The rela-
tionship between fairness and antidiscrimination is so intuitive it
49. As discussed in further detail in Part I.C, one vision of antidiscrimination focuses on
protected traits (anticlassification) and the other focuses on past disadvantage (antisubord-
ination).
50. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).
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almost escapes notice. As described, the legal definition of discrimi-
nation implies the unfairness of the underlying differentiation. That
is, to be deemed discriminatory, a decision must turn on a status
that society has already agreed is inappropriate. Fairness is in
many ways the touchstone of antidiscrimination law.
Antidiscrimination law’s connection to equality, however, is more
complex. Although antidiscrimination protections may prevent in-
dividual instances of unfair treatment, they can also be understood
as policy instruments, the ultimate goal of which is to promote
social equality by eradicating systemic disadvantage on the basis of
a particular trait or membership in a certain group.51 Perhaps
somewhat counterintuitively, treating people equally (that is, en-
suring they do not face systematic social disadvantage) may in fact
require us to treat them differently, as in the case of reasonable
accommodations for people with disabilities.52
Given its underlying norms of fairness and equality, the purpose
of antidiscrimination legislation is to prevent unfair, society-wide
disadvantage on the basis of the protected status. To accomplish
that purpose, antidiscrimination statutes restrict the criteria a
covered entity can consider when making certain kinds of socially
relevant decisions. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is an example of
a prototypical antidiscrimination provision:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
51. Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 839 (2003) (asserting that “[a]ntidiscrimination
law is best justified as a policy tool that aims to dismantle patterns of group-based social
subordination” and explaining that the wrongness of actionable discrimination stems from
“harmful effects in continuing the systematic subordination of socially salient groups”); see
also Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact
Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379, 388-91 (2007) (stating that antidiscrimination laws “are, at
their foundation, public policy”).
52. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 51, at 860-63.
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or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.53
The law forbids the covered entity (employers) from considering a
designated protected status (race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin) when making certain kinds of specific determinations
(employment-related decisions).54 Antidiscrimination statutes tend
to impose primarily negative constraints.55
Because privacy law and antidiscrimination law are regarded as
having different underlying norms, legislative purposes, and struc-
tures, they are typically understood and analyzed as separate and
distinct areas of law. I call this common understanding privacy/
antidiscrimination essentialism:
Figure 1. Privacy/Antidiscrimination Essentialism
Underlying
Norms Legislative Purpose Legal Protection Examples
Privacy
(Informational) Autonomy
Prevent unauthorized
third party access to
protected information
Restrictions on
valid access to
protected
information and
disclosure
requirements
Privacy Act
(source-based)
Cal. Social Media
Act (recipient-based)
Antidiscrimination
Equality 
Fairness
Prevent disadvantage on
the basis of protected
status
Restrictions on
considerations of
protected status
Title VII
Yet although an essentialist construction may in many cases be
accurate, another perspective is also available. Although privacy law
and antidiscrimination law may operate separately, they can also
operate symbiotically. The following Sections explore the conceptu-
al similarities between privacy and antidiscrimination and intro-
duce the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis.
53. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
54. Id.
55. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 619.
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B. Privacy and Antidiscrimination as Related Concepts
As concepts, privacy and antidiscrimination are linked. Informa-
tional privacy deals with our ability to control access to information
about ourselves. Antidiscrimination protects against disadvantage
on the basis of particular statuses. As demonstrated by the exam-
ples in the Introduction, in many cases, discriminators require
access to knowledge about protected status before they are able to
discriminate. If the law cuts off information access, it can likewise
undermine the ability to discriminate. This Section takes a step
back, looking at the theories and processes behind privacy and
antidiscrimination. 
1. Privacy
Before exploring the practical work privacy can do for antidis-
crimination, it is useful to examine the connection between these
two concepts on a theoretical level. Although what constitutes an
invasion of privacy is notoriously muddled, we can classify the
harms associated with those activities as either intrinsic56 or ex-
trinsic.57 As explained in the preceding Section, this Article focuses
on privacy’s informational aspects. Protecting certain information
indicates that this particular information is intimate or personal
and should remain within the individual’s control. In the context of
informational privacy, an intrinsic privacy harm occurs when an
unauthorized third party acquires private information.58 An extrin-
sic privacy harm occurs when that third party acts on it.59
Because privacy harms are traditionally dignitary in nature, or
as Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis famously wrote, an “injury
56. Ryan Calo has referred to such harms as “subjective” privacy harms, describing them
as being “internal to the person harmed” and “flow[ing] from the perception of unwanted
observation.” M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1142 (2011);
see also Roberts, supra note 27, at 616; Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 487.
57. Calo calls this category “objective” privacy harms and describes them as “external to
the person harmed” and “involv[ing] the forced or unanticipated use of information about a
person against that person.” Calo, supra note 56, at 1143; see also Orentlicher, supra note 27,
at 78 (discussing the possible negative consequences of sharing private medical information);
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 489.
58. See Calo, supra note 56, at 1143.
59. See id.
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to the feelings,”60 intrinsic harms are those most readily associated
with violations of privacy. An intrinsic privacy violation occurs when
an entity simply gains unauthorized access to private information,
even if that entity never actually uses the information to the
affected person’s detriment.61 So what is the harm?
Acknowledging intrinsic harms goes back to privacy’s focus on au-
tonomy. The individual experiencing the privacy violation has lost
control over information about herself. She is no longer able to
decide who knows what about her, at least in reference to the
privacy that has been breached. The harm is the loss of control and
its accompanying psychological effects, which may include any
number of nonphysical injuries, such as “incivility, lack of respect,
or causing emotional angst.”62 Importantly, these intangible harms
not only negatively impact the individual herself, but they may also
have widespread negative social implications by undermining com-
munally desirable norms like trust and respect.63 Intrinsic privacy
violations thereby generate both personal and social harm. Impor-
tantly, intrinsic privacy harms are self-contained. The privacy
violation and the resultant harm converge, occurring simultane-
ously as the injury. Put differently, the violation of the privacy is the
associated harm.
By contrast, extrinsic privacy harms are distinct from, yet related
to, the underlying privacy violation. Effectively, they are the harms
made possible by violating privacy.64 Daniel Solove calls the poten-
tial for these nondignitary harms “architectural.”65 He explains that
“[t]hey involve less the overt insult or reputational harm to a person
60. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
197 (1890).
61. See Calo, supra note 56, at 1147-48.
62. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 487.
63. Id. at 488-89 (“[P]rivacy harms affect the nature of society and impede individual
activities that contribute to the greater social good.”).
64. Not all scholars agree that such concerns are truly issues related to privacy. See
Marmor, supra note 26, at 12 (“[T]he concern here is not directly about privacy, it is a concern
about abuse of power that might follow from the fact that some particular kind of entity
knows too much about you. The concern is that the entity in question may do things that it
should not be doing with the information it has, in ways which would be detrimental to your
interests.”); see also id. (“Most of these concerns ... are not directly about matters of privacy;
the interest they protect is an additional concern that is specific to the kinds of abuse of
information that particular entities are suspected of.”).
65. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 487-88.
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and more the creation of the risk that a person might be harmed in
the future.”66 The intrusion produces the information that will serve
as the basis of another harmful act. While intrinsic privacy harms
are purely dignitary, extrinsic privacy harms may be tangible, such
as identity theft or a decision to discriminate. Additionally, whereas
a privacy violation always holds the potential to produce a concur-
rent intrinsic harm, not every privacy violation will necessarily
produce an extrinsic effect. That said, the possibility of an extrinsic
harm might constitute part of the intrinsic injury. For instance, one
reason that the autonomy loss resulting from unauthorized dis-
closure is harmful could be that it leads to anxiety about the future
discriminatory use of that information, regardless of whether that
use ever takes place.67 Further, extrinsic privacy harms have a but-
for relationship to the intrinsic privacy violation: but for my em-
ployer gaining access to my private information (intrinsic privacy
violation), my employer would not have decided to fire me (extrinsic
harm). Consequently, extrinsic privacy harms must always happen
after the intrinsic privacy violation has already occurred, if they
ever happen at all.
More often than not, laws associated with privacy tend to focus on
the intrinsic harms that could result from a violation. As previously
described with respect to informational privacy, privacy statutes
safeguard autonomy by outlawing nonconsensual, third-party
access.68 Consequently, privacy protections either restrict the
entities that may lawfully access certain information, outline how
those entities must handle that information once it is obtained, or
some combination of the two. Privacy laws therefore regulate
whether or how the information is obtained, not the possible
negative consequences that could flow from the protected informa-
tion’s acquisition. This focus on intrinsic privacy harms in part
explains privacy/antidiscrimination essentialism. Because the pri-
mary conceptualization of privacy harms is dignitary, lawmakers
and commentators may fail to appreciate how privacy law can
likewise protect against the extrinsic harm of discrimination.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 520-22.
68. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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However, as will be discussed below, certain forms of discrimination
can be recast as extrinsic privacy harms.
2. Antidiscrimination
As discussed above, equality and fairness are the underlying
norms most frequently associated with antidiscrimination. Impor-
tantly, like privacy, antidiscrimination also implicates the availabil-
ity of particular kinds of information. Depending on whether the
information related to protected status is readily ascertainable,
antidiscrimination laws can be understood as prohibitions on cer-
tain extrinsic privacy harms because those laws prevent decision
makers from using certain kinds of information to an individual’s
detriment. To make this connection more clear, it is worth unpack-
ing how discrimination takes place.
As noted, the value-neutral meaning of discrimination is simply
differentiation. Regardless of its normative implications, discrimina-
tion connotes a distinction or a difference. To discriminate in favor
of group A during hiring, an employer must first recognize that
some of its applicants are members of group A and some are not.
Acknowledging difference is the first step in the process of discrimi-
nation. That is not to say, however, that differentiation is socially
undesirable in and of itself. Human difference is a universal and
inescapable reality. No two people are exactly alike,69 and to ignore
our differences would be to deny our individuality. In fact, the
acknowledgment of difference may at times be essential to the
antidiscrimination project.70
Once we differentiate, we tend to categorize. In fact, proponents
of social cognition theory have postulated that human beings are
hardwired to group like things together to process information effi-
ciently and to function within the world.71 Categorization then leads
to the assessment of the things inside and outside those categories.72
69. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW 3 (1990).
70. See infra Part I.C (discussing the antisubordination principle).
71. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164
(1995); see also MINOW, supra note 69, at 7.
72. See MINOW, supra note 69, at 3.
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In other words, categorization leads to stereotyping.73 Like the word
“discrimination,” “stereotyping” also has neutral and pejorative
meanings. In its neutral sense, stereotyping means simply to group
together like things and make generalizations about their character-
istics.74 People stereotype all kinds of things as a matter of everyday
life. As Linda Hamilton Krieger points out, we cannot read without
stereotyping because any variation in fonts or handwriting would be
perceived as a different letter.75 Because human beings live in such
complex perceptual environments, we must simplify them in order
to function.76 To that end, Krieger asserts that stereotyping is
“nothing special.”77 It is merely an aspect of normal human cognitive
functioning.78 Differentiating and stereotyping are therefore not
intrinsically problematic. To lead to discrimination, the presence of
difference and its associated categorization must somehow cause
differential treatment; the discriminator must attach some salience
to the observed difference and its associated categorization within
the relevant domain. The employer must have positive associations
with members of group A (or negative associations with nonmem-
bers) in the context of work. This type of value assignment is the
second step in the process of many instances of discrimination.
Value assignment occurs when the difference goes from a neutral
observation (A is different than B) to a preference-related judgment
(A is better than B). When people differentiate and categorize, they
likewise adhere meaning to those distinctions, paving the way for
the construction of social hierarchies and creating a basis for differ-
ential treatment.79 Only when a categorization is affiliated with a
73. Id.
74. See Krieger, supra note 71, at 1164.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1188-89.
77. Id. at 1187-88.
78. Id. (“It is simply a form of categorization, similar in structure and function to the
categorization of natural objects. According to this view, stereotypes, like other categorical
structures, are cognitive mechanisms that all people, not just ‘prejudiced’ ones, use to simplify
the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in memory. They
are central, and indeed essential to normal cognitive functioning.”).
79. Martha Minow has written quite eloquently on this point:
When we identify one thing as like the others, we are not merely classifying the
world; we are investing particular classifications with consequences and
positioning ourselves in relation to those meanings. When we identify one thing
as unlike the others, we are dividing the world; we use our language to exclude,
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negative attribute does it become a “stereotype” in the unfavorable
sense. Thus, acknowledging and grouping difference gives way to
the creation of cognitive biases, and it is those biases that ulti-
mately lead to discriminatory conduct.80 Discrimination can be
understood as a multistage process that requires at least two
preceding steps: (1) differentiation (categorization) and (2) value
assignment:
Figure 2. Process of Discrimination
Differentiation (Categorization)  Value Assignment  Discriminatory Act(s)
This three-part process captures both intentional and certain unin-
tentional varieties of discrimination.
In the case of intentional discrimination, the process of differenti-
ation, value assignment, and discriminatory conduct is quite clear.
A discriminator observes a difference, consciously attaches a value
to that difference, and then acts with a clear intent to discriminate.
There are at least two ways to discriminate intentionally—by
animus or by proxy—and both involve conscious reliance on an
acknowledged difference. Animus-based intentional discrimination
is the garden-variety form of discrimination. A discriminator has a
negative association with a particular attribute and acts on that
negative association. In such cases, the discriminator has stigma-
tized the relevant difference.81 Negative affect is, therefore, the
value linked to the difference in the second step.
Discriminators may also consciously consider difference not out
of dislike, but out of perceived utility. For example, an employer
may opt not to hire or promote women of child-bearing age based on
to distinguish, to discriminate.
MINOW, supra note 69, at 3.
80. Krieger, supra note 71, at 1190, 1199.
81. Difference is thus also a prerequisite for stigma formation. See Bruce G. Link & Jo C.
Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363 (2001) (describing stigma formation
in four stages: (1) acknowledging and labeling difference, (2) generating negative stereotypes
based on those labels, (3) categorizing people based on labels, (4) diminishing social status
based on labels); see also MINOW, supra note 69, at 50 (“Buried in the questions about
difference are assumptions that difference is linked to stigma and that sameness is a
prerequisite for equality.”).
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the belief that they are more likely to leave or take time off to raise
a family, making them a riskier investment of the employer’s re-
sources.82 In such a case, the employer actively takes difference into
account, but the value attached to the relevant difference is based
on its approximation of some other quality or tendency rather than
dislike.
Likewise, unconscious biases may also lead to discrimination, but
absent any explicit intent to discriminate or even the knowledge of
the bias itself. Social cognition research reveals that normal cogni-
tive function can result in social stereotyping.83 These stereotypes,
complete with their assigned values, then shape perception. Krieger
explains:
Social cognition theory provides a fundamentally different ex-
planation of how stereotypes cause discrimination. Stereotypes
are viewed as social schemas or person prototypes. They operate
as implicit expectancies that influence how incoming informa-
tion is interpreted, the causes to which events are attributed,
and how events are encoded into, retained in, and retrieved from
memory. In other words, stereotypes cause discrimination by
biasing how we process information about other people.84
The stereotype distorts the information.85 Perhaps frustratingly
then, people are frequently unaware of their own cognitive pro-
cesses, making the discrimination not just unintentional but also
unconscious.86 Hence, some discriminators may hold the good faith
belief that they are acting without bias.87 They do not realize that
they have engaged in the value assignment necessary to produce a
discriminatory outcome. Normal cognitive function related to pro-
cessing and understanding human difference—not outright animus
or discriminatory intent—can, therefore, lead to discrimination.88
82. Krieger uses a similar example to construct a syllogism for describing proxy
discrimination. Krieger, supra note 71, at 1182-83.
83. Id. at 1198.
84. Id. at 1199.
85. Id. at 1198 (“[T]he stereotype, acting as an associative construct, biases the way we
see the evidence.”).
86. See id.
87. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
969, 974-75 (2006); see also Krieger, supra note 71, at 1209.
88. According to Krieger, this observation is a “central premise of social cognition theo-
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Moreover, social cognition theory also reveals that discrimination is
not necessarily the result of a single moment of decision, but rather
the culmination of various experiences or interactions.89 Over time,
small differences in attitude or treatment can accumulate to create
disparities. Discrimination could thereby be the result of a series of
small—perhaps unconscious—decisions.90 Yet the unintentional and
amorphous nature of this form of discriminatory conduct does not
mean it is not harmful. Even subtle and unconscious forms of
discrimination can violate the antidiscrimination principle by
undermining fairness and equality.91
Although the three-part process described above captures how
many types of discrimination occur, it fails to describe one very im-
portant class of unintended discrimination: discrimination caused
by various administrative or structural barriers, such as height,
educational requirements, or inaccessible spaces. In such cases, the
employer does not intend to discriminate but adopts a policy or
occupies a building that has the practical effect of excluding individ-
uals with a certain protected status. For example, an employer that
adopts a minimum height requirement to ensure its employees can
safely operate machinery will ultimately exclude more women than
men from eligibility.92 Likewise, a degree requirement may exclude
more people of color than whites.93 Finally, an employer that im-
poses a lifting requirement will likely hire fewer individuals with
disabilities.94 These kinds of situations are collectively known as
ry—that cognitive structures and processes involved in categorization and information
processing can in and of themselves result in stereotyping and other forms of biased inter-
group judgment previously attributed to motivational processes.” Krieger, supra note 71, at
1187.
89. Id. at 1190-91.
90. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469 (2001) (noting that “behavior that appears gender
neutral, when considered in isolation, may actually produce gender bias when connected to
broader exclusionary patterns”).
91. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 972 (“If people are treated differently, and worse,
because of their race or another protected trait, then the principle of antidiscrimination has
been violated, even if the source of the differential treatment is implicit rather than conscious
bias.”).
92. See generally LEX K. LARSON ET AL., LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 42.03
(2013) (describing the disparate impact effects of height and weight requirements).
93. See id. § 26.04 (describing the disparate impact effects of educational requirements).
94. See, e.g., Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Thorne Assocs. Inc., 893 F. Supp. 2d 952
(N.D. Ill. 2012); Stinson v. W. Suburban Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 97 C 3701, 1998 WL 188938
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cases of “disparate impact” and are legally actionable.95 Although
the process above describes both intentional and unintentional
“disparate treatment,”96 it does not apply to every variety of
unlawful discrimination.
Ordinary antidiscrimination laws intervene at the last stage of
the discrimination process: the discriminatory conduct itself.97 Be-
cause they simply prohibit decisions based on protected status, they
do not seek to prevent the preceding differentiation or value
assignment that makes those decisions possible.98 As will be dis-
cussed at greater length, invoking privacy protections intervenes at
the first step of the discrimination process, rendering the subse-
quent valuation and discrimination impossible as a practical mat-
ter.99 Privacy law has the power to cut the process of discrimination
short.
C. Privacy/Antidiscrimination Symbiosis
The previous Section explored how privacy relates to antidis-
crimination on a conceptual level. This Section takes the resulting
observations and uses them to develop a strategy for legal protection
that uses privacy law to prevent discrimination. Specifically, it
argues that certain violations of privacy can also be understood as
antidiscrimination harms, and vice versa. Consequently, protections
generally considered to be “privacy laws” can also be construed as
antidiscrimination protections.
Because discrimination frequently requires the presence of
acknowledged difference, access to information related to protected
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1998).
95. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 28, at 538 (defining “disparate impact”).
96. Id.
97. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 977-78.
98. See id. at 978.
99. Of course, some scholars advocate the second step as the proper place for intervention.
See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 69 (advocating the abandonment of majoritarian norms that
distinguish one group from another and a reexamination of the way we draw distinctions);
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 977 (proposing that “[t]he law might engage in ... debiasing
... seeking to reduce people’s level of bias rather than to insulate outcomes from its effects”);
Krieger, supra note 71, at 1166 (“[T]he nondiscrimination principle, currently interpreted as
a proscriptive duty ‘not to discriminate,’ must evolve to encompass a prescriptive duty of care
to identify and control for category-based judgment errors and other forms of cognitive bias
in intergroup settings”).
2122 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2097
status gives employers the opportunity to discriminate. Privacy
protections can prevent entities from discriminating by obscuring
their knowledge of the protected status. Although ultimately ar-
guing in favor of increasing the availability of personal information
to reduce discrimination, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz acknowledges this
position:
One way to protect African Americans and other disadvantaged
groups would be to make them appear indistinguishable from
whites. Indeed, some efforts to reform antidiscrimination law
have suggested that statistical discrimination can be mitigated
if the relevant decision makers are deprived of information
about a candidate’s race, religion, and gender. With less infor-
mation, decision makers presumably will focus more on the
black and white of a job applicant’s resume and less on the black
or white of an applicant’s skin.100
If an employer cannot access a particular kind of information, she
cannot discriminate on the basis of that information. However, once
an employer acquires the ability to discriminate, the knowledge of
an employee’s protected status may influence the employer’s
decisions in conscious, as well as unconscious, ways. Capitalizing on
the insight that information access may be a prerequisite for
discrimination in certain circumstances, lawmakers could adopt
privacy protections with the explicit purpose of preempting discrim-
inatory conduct.
Figure 3. Privacy/Antidiscrimination Symbiosis
 UnderlyingNorms Legislative Purpose
Legal 
Protection
Privacy law as
antidiscrimination law
Equality 
Fairness
Prevent disadvantage on the
basis of protected status
Restrictions on valid access
to information related to
protected status
Unlike ordinary antidiscrimination laws, which attack the dis-
criminatory conduct itself, privacy law as an antidiscrimination
instrument acts earlier, intervening at the differentiation stage of
100. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 371
(2008).
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the process. However, whether discrimination constitutes an extrin-
sic privacy violation, and by consequence an appropriate target for
privacy law, depends upon the antidiscrimination perspective that
lawmakers adopt.
When debating how the law should protect against systematic
social disadvantage, scholars employ two differing constructions
of the meaning of antidiscrimination: antisubordination and an-
ticlassification.101 Antisubordination holds that the goal of the anti-
discrimination project should be elevating the social status of
historically disadvantaged groups, for example, people of color and
women.102 Anticlassification, however, maintains that individuals
should not face intentional discrimination on the basis of certain
protected traits, such as race and sex, regardless of a history of
social subjugation.103 An antisubordination approach advocates
ending both intended and unintended disparities faced by racial
minorities and women, including through positive differential treat-
ment like affirmative action or diversity initiatives. In contrast,
anticlassification would support outlawing any intentional consid-
eration, positive or negative, of race or sex generally. These two
visions of antidiscrimination implicate privacy differently. 
On one hand, anticlassification—with its ban on all differentia-
tion on the basis of a protected trait—favors strong privacy protec-
tion. In fact, anticlassification norms are often referred to in terms
of “blindness.”104 Because anticlassification holds that employers
should behave as though they cannot see the individual’s protected
status, that construction of the antidiscrimination principle renders
them “blind” to the protected status. The logic behind blindness
policies is even more straightforward when the protected status is
unknown. If we can prevent access to the protected information
101. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003); Reva B. Siegel,
Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles
over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
102. Siegel, supra note 101, at 1472-73 (defining the antisubordination principle).
103. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 101, at 10 (defining the anticlassification principle).
104. The most culturally pervasive example of the trait blindness approach to
antidiscrimination law is, of course, “colorblindness.” As a disability studies scholar, I do not
personally advocate the language of blindness to describe antidiscrimination norms; however,
I acknowledge it here because of its pervasiveness and relevance to the subject matter of this
Article.
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(intrinsic privacy harm), we can safeguard against discrimination
on the basis of that information further down the line (extrinsic
privacy harm). Strong privacy protections take the blindness trope
a step further: There is no need to feign blindness if the relevant
status is never “seen.” Privacy protections for information related
to protected status thus safeguard against both intrinsic privacy
harms and the extrinsic privacy harm of violating the anticlas-
sification principle.
On the other hand, antisubordination sometimes may require the
relinquishing of privacy to realize its objectives. As explained, this
iteration of the antidiscrimination principle seeks to elevate the
social status of historically subjugated groups. Instead of merely
outlawing all considerations of race or sex, antisubordination at-
tempts to raise the social standing of people of color and women. In
so doing, the antisubordination principle targets both intentional
and unintentional discrimination and advocates affirmative action
to promote equality, integration, and access. Consequently, anti-
subordination embraces disparate impact actions, as well as positive
differential treatment for members of the protected group.105 Its
support for both disparate impact actions and positive differential
treatment distinguishes antisubordination from anticlassification.106
These two qualities also place antisubordination at odds with priva-
cy in certain circumstances. Specifically, to assess whether a policy
disproportionately impacts a particular group, or to allow affirma-
tive action, the covered entity must have some knowledge of the
relevant information. A robust privacy protection may be ideally
suited for anticlassification,107 but may actually function to under-
mine certain goals of antisubordination. In this way, privacy and
antisubordination may at times be in tension.108
In sum, the ability for privacy to prevent discrimination depends
upon the approach taken. An anticlassification approach to antidis-
crimination favors “blindness”; that is, acting as though a protected
105. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 101, at 9.
106. Id. at 12.
107. From a practical perspective, complete ignorance of protected status may not be
desirable, even for those favoring anticlassification. For example, disclosures to the EEOC of
employees’ race and sex might allow employers to uncover disparate treatment of their
employees. See infra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
108. I explore the tension between robust privacy protections and the antidiscrimination
principle at greater length below in Part III.B.
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status is imperceptible.109 Privacy law is, therefore, a powerful tool
for anticlassification because it can deny potential discriminators
access to the information in the first place. However, the antisub-
ordination approach requires access to information related to protec-
ted status to facilitate disparate impact actions and positive differ-
ential treatment. Antisubordination may be at odds with privacy
law in some circumstances.
It is worth pausing for a moment here to acknowledge a signifi-
cant weakness of privacy law as antidiscrimination law, as well as
anticlassification in general. An individual’s protected status, such
as her race, her religion, or her disability often constitutes an
important aspect of her personal identity, making it something she
may want to celebrate rather than obscure. To the extent that
anticlassification and privacy pressure an individual to conform,
pass, cover, assimilate, or stifle her ability to freely express a
meaningful identity, they can be understood as socially damaging
and counter to many goals of the greater antidiscrimination project.
In other words, we might be effectively preventing negative dif-
ferential treatment on the basis of a protected status, while at the
same time denying the social relevance and cultural richness of the
status itself, as well as the benefits of diversity writ large. Further-
more, privacy does nothing to undo the existence of negative social
stereotypes. Thus, using privacy to prevent discrimination could
eliminate the symptom without addressing the cause. Part III.D.2
attempts to address these concerns by discussing socially beneficial
disclosures. This Article takes the position that the individual
herself—rather than potential discriminators like employers—
should decide when and how to disclose information related to
protected status. Using privacy protections to thwart discrimination
prohibits unwanted inquiries by third parties, yet does not obligate
silence by the individual.
Moreover, in many situations individuals cannot control the
perception of difference, even if they wanted to. For this reason, pri-
vacy law frequently would do little work in preventing discrimina-
tion, leaving antidiscrimination law to bear the brunt of the burden.
Take race as an example. If an individual’s appearance provides
clues to her racial identity, she cannot conceal her difference (yet if
109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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she can pass she may at times choose to do so); however, Title VII
prevents her employer from taking this particular information into
account when making employment decisions.110 While the individual
may not be able to control who accesses information related to her
race, the law can intervene to prevent entities from acting on that
information.
Finally, this Article does not seek to supplant the reasons law-
makers have opted to protect privacy in the past. To be sure,
preventing discrimination is neither the single nor best reason to
safeguard sensitive information. Privacy protections also generate
independent benefits, such as supporting individual autonomy and
self-differentiation. For example, even in cases when an individual’s
status might be apparent upon meeting her, the act of asking itself
may constitute a dignitary offense because the inquiry could be
perceived as an act of prying111 or because it makes the person feel
self-conscious.112 However, this Article primarily concerns itself
with the work privacy can do with respect to preempting systematic
disadvantage, not the benefits of privacy qua privacy. Going back to
the distinction between norms, legislative purpose, and legal protec-
tions discussed in Part I.A, this approach demonstrates how a type
of legal protection that on its face appears to align with privacy may
also serve the goals and norms associated with antidiscrimination.
 
* * * 
 
Privacy law and antidiscrimination law have been understood as
distinct kinds of legal protections with different underlying goals
and norms. However, privacy and antidiscrimination are con-
ceptually linked.113 Privacy deals with control over one’s personal
information, and in many cases even unconscious discrimination
requires differentiation and, as a result, knowledge.114 If individu-
als could control the kinds of information available to potential dis-
110. Civil Rights Act of 1967 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2 (2012).
111. See Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 500 (identifying “interrogation”
as a harm associated with invasions of privacy).
112. Drawing attention to a protected status could actually affect performance. Thus
merely asking could be harmful. See Jessica L. Roberts, Rethinking Antidiscrimination Harms
(2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
113. See supra Part I.B.
114. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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criminators, they might be able to prevent discrimination from
occurring. The kinds of legal protections typically associated with
privacy can serve the goal of antidiscrimination by restricting access
to information related to protected status, rendering the decision
maker incapable of using that information to a person’s detriment.
II. THE PRIVACY/ANTIDISCRIMINATION SYMBIOSIS IN ACTION
The preceding Part dismantled privacy/antidiscrimination essen-
tialism by demonstrating the conceptual linkage between privacy
and antidiscrimination, particularly the anticlassification principle,
and introduced the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis. This Part
turns from theory to practice.
For the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis to operate, the infor-
mation related to protected status must be unknown. Privacy is,
therefore, a particularly strong weapon against genetic-information
discrimination. Whereas traditional antidiscrimination categories
like race and sex tend to be readily observable, most genetic
information is not visible to the naked eye.115 As a result, obtaining
genetic information frequently requires taking a genetic test.116
Accordingly, becoming the object of genetic-information discrimina-
tion can necessitate taking positive action.117 This opt-in quality
differentiates genetic-information discrimination from the more
traditional antidiscrimination categories and, as a result, makes it
a particularly good candidate for using privacy to combat discrimi-
nation.
In 2008, Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrim-
ination Act (GINA).118 GINA, which prohibits genetic-information
discrimination in health insurance and employment, does more
than simply outlaw discriminatory conduct. It also prohibits employ-
ers from requiring—or even requesting—their employees’ genetic
115. Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, & Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 711
(2012); Pauline Kim, Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectives from the U.S.
Experience, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 693, 699-700 (2010). 
116. Roberts, supra note 27, at 624.
117. Id. at 624-25. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes a person’s appearance
will reveal an aspect of their genetic information. For example, one can deduce from visual
observation that an individual has trisomy 21.
118. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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information.119 It thus contains both privacy and antidiscrimination
protections. This Part invokes GINA as a practical example of the
blending of these two substantive legal paradigms within a single
antidiscrimination law. It reads GINA’s antidiscrimination and
privacy provisions in concert, arguing that the statute has an anti-
discrimination purpose and that Congress employed privacy law
with the explicit intent of preventing discrimination when it banned
attempts to obtain genetic information. GINA is best understood as
a real-world example of the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis.
A. GINA’s Protections
Title II of GINA prevents employers, and other employment-
related entities, from engaging in certain kinds of conduct that
implicate an individual’s genetic information.120 It defines “genetic
information” as “(i) such individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic
tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifesta-
tion of a disease or disorder in family members of such individ-
ual.”121 
Title II prohibits employers from soliciting genetic information.
Section 202(b) states that an employer may not “request, require, or
purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or a
family member of the employee.”122 Although the subsection is titled
“Acquisition of Genetic Information,” an employer need not ac-
quire—let alone act on—an employee’s genetic information to run
afoul of the statute. The employer need only ask.123 Because of the
broad definition of genetic information described above, GINA out-
laws not only inquiring into an individual’s genetic test results, but
also prohibits asking about her family’s health history.124 GINA’s
section 202(b) follows the structure of a recipient-based privacy
law. It outlaws unwanted inquiries by forbidding a particular kind
of third party, employers, from attempting to obtain the protected
119. Id. § 202.
120. See id. §§ 202-06.
121. Id. § 201(4)(A)(i)-(iii). 
122. Id. § 202(b).
123. See id.
124. Id.
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information.125 GINA thereby protects against the kinds of
autonomy-based harms ordinarily associated with privacy viola-
tions.126
Outside of section 202, GINA also protects the genetic privacy of
employees, albeit from a source-based perspective.127 Section 206,
Title II’s confidentiality provision, mandates that covered entities
treat lawfully obtained genetic information as part of an employee’s
confidential medical record but requires them to keep that informa-
tion on separate forms and keep it in separate files.128 The provision
also outlines which disclosures of lawfully obtained genetic informa-
tion are proper, including to the employee herself, to authorized
health researchers, and when done in response to official requests
such as court orders or to otherwise comply with the law.129 Because
section 206 is a source-based privacy protection, its target is
dissemination.130
Through its privacy and confidentiality provisions, GINA seeks to
safeguard genetic information from unwanted intrusions.131 How-
ever, as will be discussed at length in the ensuing Section, privacy
is not the only lens through which to view GINA’s section 202(b).
Unlike the novel privacy provision, GINA’s prohibition on employ-
ment discrimination tracks the language found in other federal
antidiscrimination statutes.132 Section 202(a) deems it unlawful for
an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any employee, or
otherwise to discriminate against any employee with respect to
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
of the employee, because of genetic information with respect to
the employee; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify the employees of the employer
in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any employee
125. See id.
126. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 616-17.
127. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 206.
128. Id. § 206(a). GINA adopts the same standards for employee medical privacy as the
ADA adopts. Compare id., with Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
§ 102, 104 Stat. 331-33 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012)).
129. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 206(b).
130. See id.
131. See id. §§ 202-06.
132. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
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of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the
status of the employee as an employee, because of genetic
information with respect to the employee.133
Prohibited conduct includes adverse employment actions such as
failing to hire, firing, or otherwise discriminating in compensation
or other privileges of employment, as well as segregating or
classifying employees based on their genetic information.134 GINA
draws heavily from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.135 Section
202(a) represents an ordinary antidiscrimination protection, a
provision that promotes fairness and equality by constraining a
covered entity’s ability to consider protected status when making
particular choices.136
When Congress passed GINA in 2008, many agreed that it was
not a typical antidiscrimination statute.137 In particular, GINA’s ban
on requesting, requiring, or purchasing sets it apart from its
predecessors.138 The vast majority of federal law does not prohibit
employers from seeking—or even disclosing—information related to
other kinds of protected statuses, such as an employee’s race, sex,
national origin, religion, or age.139 Instead, most employment dis-
crimination legislation simply outlaws adverse employment actions
on the basis of the protected trait.140 For example, Title VII outlaws
acting on—but not acquiring—the relevant information.141 In most
circumstances, employers may inquire into an employee’s protected
status without discriminating against her as a matter of law.142
133. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 202(a).
134. Id.
135. See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 452-53 (2010) (comparing Title II
of GINA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
136. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 619; see also Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen,
Genophobia: What Is Wrong with Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1445
(2001); Kim, supra note 115, at 697.
137. See Roberts, supra note 135, at 440-41; see also Areheart, supra note 115, at 706-08;
Corbett, supra note 19, at 1, 2; Kim, supra note 115, at 697.
138. See Corbett, supra note 19, at 9 (asserting that GINA “is written in the language of
a workplace privacy law”).
139. Corbett, supra note 19, at 3. 
140. See id.
141. Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Secrets: A Policy Framework, in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra note 25, at 459-60.
142. See id.; see also Corbett, supra note 19, at 3, 4.
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GINA’s additional level of protection led at least one commentator
to refer to GINA as an antidiscrimination-privacy hybrid.143
Although GINA is widely regarded as atypical, it is not the first
federal antidiscrimination law to incorporate a privacy protection.144
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) also includes a privacy-
related provision.145 Section 12112(d)(1) states that the definition of
“discrimination” on the basis of disability includes “medical examin-
ations and inquiries.”146 The statute provides that, pre-employment,
it is acceptable to ask about job-related functions147 but “a covered
entity shall not conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of
a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a
disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.”148 The
ADA then also contains a provision that reads like a recipient-based
privacy provision.149 However, the ADA’s protection of privacy is not
absolute. Although employers cannot ask about disability status
that is unrelated to job function before extending an offer, the stat-
ute allows employers to condition employment on post-offer medical
exams, so long as those examinations are universally conducted for
all entering employees, and the results are kept confidential.150
Hence, the ADA protects applicants from inquiries into their disabil-
ity but they lose some measure of that protection after receiving a
conditional offer.151 (From a practical perspective, however, many
employers seem to have abandoned widespread medical inquiries
for fear of running afoul of the statute.152) Once an employee
143. See Corbett, supra note 19, at 3 (calling GINA “a hybrid—part antidiscrimination
statute and part privacy law”).
144. See Rothstein, supra note 141, at 460.
145. See id.; see also Corbett, supra note 19, at 3, 4.
146. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2012).
147. Id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
148. Id. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
149. See generally id. § 12112(d).
150. Id. § 12112(d)(2)(A)-(3)(B). The ADA also provides that the results of the exam be used
only in conjunction with the employment-related inquiry. Id. § 12112(d)(3)(C). Moreover,
employers may not impose qualification standards, which could include passing a medical
exam, unless the results are “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” Id.
§ 12112(d)(4)(A).
151. Rothstein, supra note 141, at 460.
152. Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with
Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 346 (2009); see
also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1145 (2014).
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actually begins working, the employer cannot “require a medical
examination” or “make inquiries of an employee as to whether such
employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or
severity of the disability” unless the exam or inquiry is “job-related
and consistent with business necessity.”153 Thus, the ADA differs
from GINA in the robustness of its privacy protection.
But even in light of the ADA, GINA’s inclusion of a strong privacy
protection directly alongside an antidiscrimination mandate is dis-
tinctive.154 Although the ADA provides that preemployment medi-
cal exams and inquiries constitute discrimination, it does so in a
separate subsection, apart from the other statutory definitions of
what it means to discriminate,155 and it relaxes that protection
post-offer.156 Conversely, GINA’s privacy and antidiscrimination
provisions appear side by side and protect both applicants and
employees alike.157 When the law passed, it garnered significant
attention for blending these two kinds of protections.158 Yet un-
derstanding GINA’s privacy and antidiscrimination provisions as
separate and distinct oversimplifies the relationship between these
two kinds of law. GINA is in fact the product of the privacy/anti-
discrimination symbiosis.
B. GINA as Symbiotic Legislation
The legal protection of genetic information offers a useful exam-
ple of the tension inherent in the privacy/antidiscrimination essen-
tialism described in Part I. Although advocates of safeguarding
genetic information recognized the need for both kinds of protec-
tions, the initial efforts to regulate genetic information were often
split between efforts to protect privacy and efforts to prevent
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
154. See Corbett, supra note 19, at 4, 5, 8-10.
155. The definition of “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability”
appears in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b), and the provisions dealing with medical examinations appear
in § 12112(d).
156. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
157. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 201-
02, 122 Stat. 881, 905-08 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-1 (2012)).
158. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 19, at 2 (describing GINA as “a mutant antidiscrimina-
tion statute, differing in significant ways from prior antidiscrimination laws”); Kim, supra
note 115, at 697 (stating that “GINA is a strange sort of antidiscrimination law”).
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discrimination.159 For example, early state protections did not stop
employers from obtaining that information, only from using it to
discriminate.160 While state laws focused on antidiscrimination
measures, the first federal bill dealing with genetic information was
the Human Genome Privacy Act, introduced in 1990.161 The
legislation, which ultimately died in committee, would have
outlawed the unauthorized disclosure of genetic information
generated by federal agencies or federally funded entities, offering
individuals remedies as well as providing criminal penalties for
intentional violations.162 The next federal legislation designed to
protect genetic information was the Genetic Privacy and Nondis-
crimination Act of 1995.163 That law sought to “protect against
discrimination by an insurer or employer based upon an individual’s
genetic information” by limiting the conditions under which genetic
information could be lawfully disclosed, and expanding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to cover genetic-information discrimination.164
Although the Human Genome Privacy Act and the Genetic Privacy
and Nondiscrimination Act included privacy protections, the
majority of bills proposed to combat genetic discrimination in the
workplace simply outlawed the use of genetic information, not its
acquisition.165 Legal scholars recognized that genetic information
simultaneously required both privacy and antidiscrimination
protection. Yet like the legislators described above, many academics
differentiated privacy and antidiscrimination as separate grounds
for protecting genetic information with different concomitant legal
159. See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace,
in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra
note 25, at 281, 291-92.
160. Id. at 292. But see Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the
Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 50 (1999) (“Employment
discrimination is also a focal point of state genetics legislation. Employers may be prevented
from requiring genetic tests of job applicants or using genetic information for employment
decisions.” (citing statutes from New Jersey, Wisconsin, Texas, and Rhode Island)); Silvers
& Stein, supra note 36, at 1359 (“Although current state laws lean heavily on precedents of
privacy, antidiscrimination provisions have been sprinkled among them.”).
161. Philip R. Reilly, Laws to Regulate the Use of Genetic Information, in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra note 25, at 369, 372.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 381.
164. Id.
165. See Rothstein, supra note 141, at 478 (“Most of the current proposals to prohibit
genetic discrimination in employment merely prohibit employer use of genetic information.”).
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safeguards. For instance, in a 1999 article, Lawrence Gostin and
James Hodge differentiated between “information management”
(privacy) and “harm avoidance” (antidiscrimination) as two distinct
kinds of legal protections for genetic information.166 In 2002, Anita
Silvers and Michael Stein noted that both the actual pre-GINA
protections for genetic information and the scholarly discussions of
the underlying right at stake were split between privacy and
equality interests.167 Colin Diver and Jane Cohen put it simply in
their 2001 piece, stating that privacy and antidiscrimination
protections for genetic information are “analytically and morally
distinct.”168 Given the assertion that privacy and antidiscrimination
represented different goals with different types of legal safeguards,
advocates of protecting genetic information would sometimes prefer
one type of provision over the other. Most notably, pre-GINA,
Pauline Kim argued that antidiscrimination was not the appropri-
ate legal vehicle to protect genetic information.169 Identifying
personal autonomy—and not equality—as the relevant norm at
stake, she advocated privacy as the best means for shielding
employees from the misuse of their genetic profiles.170 Describing
antidiscrimination and privacy as “alternative paradigms” that
“have distinct motivations and focus on different factors,” Kim as-
serted that “the privacy rights model more appropriately addresses
employer use of genetic information, both as a theoretical and a
practical matter.”171 Thus, although Kim acknowledged the concep-
tual relationship between privacy and antidiscrimination,172 she
166. See generally Gostin & Hodge, supra note 160.
167. Silvers & Stein, supra note 36, at 1344 (asserting that pre-GINA “statutes, orders, and
guidelines have been designed either to protect against violations of individuals’ privacy or
to ensure their equal treatment in obtaining social goods, services, and opportunities by
prohibiting discriminatory actions” and that “[e]thicists and legal scholars divide on whether
these harms are properly conceptualized as ‘discrimination’ and whether privacy or equal
opportunity is the main right we need to protect”).
168. Diver & Cohen, supra note 136, at 1445; see also Kim, supra note 115, at 703
(distinguishing between “privacy rights and anti-discrimination norms”).
169. Kim, supra note 19, at 1543.
170. Id. at 1537 (“If employer use of genetic information primarily threatens individual
autonomy, then privacy law likely offers a better model for addressing that concern than the
traditional antidiscrimination paradigm.”).
171. Id. at 1532; see also Corbett, supra note 19, at 8-9 (“Before GINA became law, genetic
information was viewed by many as a privacy issue, and it was argued that privacy law
offered a more appropriate treatment than antidiscrimination law.”).
172. Kim, supra note 19, at 1532 (acknowledging that “the concerns that underlie
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viewed their normative purposes and associated legal protections as
separate and distinct, with privacy as the more desirable option.
Conversely, Silvers and Stein argued in favor of antidiscrimination
protection on the basis of genetic identity as an alternative to the
privacy paradigm.173 Post-GINA, scholars continued to differentiate
between privacy and antidiscrimination as different types of legal
protections. Bill Corbett has referred to GINA as “a hybrid—part
antidiscrimination statute and part privacy law.”174 However,
commentators differ on whether privacy or antidiscrimination
constitutes the proper legal framework for safeguarding genetic
information.175
To be fair, while distinguishing between privacy and antidiscrim-
ination as legal protections that are different in kind, these authors
have also noted that GINA’s protection of genetic privacy may thwart
discrimination on the basis of genetic information by employers.
However, instead of reading sections 202(a) and 202(b) as different
types of protections that serve distinct underlying norms and leg-
islative purposes, this Article asserts that GINA’s privacy provi-
sion is explicitly designed to serve the statute’s antidiscrimination
objective. It is a real-world example of the privacy/antidiscrimina-
tion symbiosis. Although section 202(b) reads like a typical privacy
protection, GINA’s structure and legislative history indicate that
Congress was acting with a clear antidiscrimination objective.176
For instance, the statute’s heading describes the law as an act
“[t]o prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic information with
respect to health insurance and employment,” not as an effort to
protect genetic privacy.177 Thus, GINA’s primary legislative objective
is antidiscrimination.178 Not surprisingly then, the congressional
antidiscrimination laws and privacy rights are related”).
173. See generally Silvers & Stein, supra note 36.
174. Corbett, supra note 19, at 3.
175. Kim has maintained that an antidiscrimination framework would ultimately prove
inadequate, calling strong privacy protections “the key to preventing misuse of genetic
information by employers,” Kim, supra note 115, at 693-94, whereas Areheart has explored
how section 202(b) might undermine efforts to outlaw subordination on the basis of genetic
information, see generally Areheart, supra note 115.
176. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202, 122
Stat. 881, 907-08 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2012)).
177. Id. (quoting the purpose statement of the Act).
178. The same claim can be made with respect to the ADA’s prohibition on preemployment
inquiries into disability. Title I of the ADA seeks to eliminate employment discrimination on
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findings focus more strongly upon the need for antidiscrimination—
not privacy—protection. For example, after lauding recent develop-
ments in genetic science, Congress warned that “[t]hese advances
give rise to the potential misuse of genetic information to discrimi-
nate in health insurance and employment.”179 The findings cite the
history of forced sterilization and racially targeted sickle-cell screen-
ings, in addition to present-day evidence of genetic-information
discrimination, to demonstrate the need for a federal antidiscrimin-
ation law.180 Finally, section 202(b)’s placement in the statute gives
additional clues regarding its purpose. Congress included the ban
on acquiring genetic information in the antidiscrimination—not the
confidentiality—portion of the statute.181 Interestingly, neither the
text of Title II, nor the statute’s purpose, explicitly mentions
privacy.182 In drafting section 202, Congress was not seeking to
protect against separate and distinct privacy and antidiscrimination
harms, but instead was intentionally using privacy to combat
discrimination.
Congress also referenced the chilling effect that the fear of
discrimination had on the public’s willingness to take genetic tests
to justify its legislative intervention.183 Interestingly, those fears
implicate both antidiscrimination and privacy concerns. Pre-GINA,
over 90 percent of Americans expressed anxiety about the misuse of
their genetic information should potential discriminators gain
access.184 When asked about her fears related to genetic testing, one
person reported:
I just was worried about being viewed differently.... I don’t know
if discrimination is the right word—but it’s probably the best
word.... An analogy is: women who are young and probably go-
ing to have kids. Although they aren’t discriminated against,
everybody knows: if you hire this person, you might be stuck
the basis of disability, and one of its mechanisms for so doing is through prohibiting certain
kinds of medical exams. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102,
104 Stat. 327, 331-33 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012)).
179. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 2(1).
180. Id. § 2(2)-(4).
181. Compare id. § 202, with id. § 206.
182. Id. §§ 2, 202.
183. Id. § 2(4)
184. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 603.
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with a huge maternity leave bill. That influences people, even
good people, indirectly. They have reservations, want a back-up
plan, and may not give these employees all the work: “I won’t
give you all these projects.” It would be illegal. But I’m sure a
little bit of that goes on.185
The individual was concerned that discrimination—including
unintentional or unconscious discrimination—could quickly follow
the knowledge of difference. In other words, when “everybody
knows” about a vulnerable status, it opens the door for devalua-
tion and unfavorable differential treatment. Another individual,
who tested positive for a genetic variation associated with respi-
ratory disease, likewise chose to keep the results private because
she feared future disadvantage: “It just seemed safer to keep it
to myself ... I didn’t know what somebody would do with that
information in the future ... and I was very concerned about it.”186 
People who have taken genetic tests understand the relationship
between testing, revelation, and discrimination. Specifically, they
recognize how differences can lead to devaluation and eventually
discrimination. People had two related fears surrounding genetic
testing: (1) that their genetic information would be disclosed with-
out their consent (intrinsic privacy harm) and (2) that once released,
third parties would use that information to discriminate (extrinsic
privacy/antidiscrimination harm).187 Because individuals have to opt
in for genetic-information discrimination in a way they do not for
more traditional antidiscrimination categories, these twin concerns
led some individuals to avoid genetic tests.188 Those people employed
their own version of protecting privacy to prevent discrimination.
Restricting access to genetic information could also safeguard
against future disadvantage on the basis of that information.189
185. Robert Klitzman, Views of Discrimination Among Individuals Confronting Genetic
Disease, 19 J. GENETIC COUNS. 68, 72-73 (2010).
186. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICS, PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN
WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 42 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/P353-79FF (quoting
Victoria Grove, an individual with a positve genetic test for alpha-1 antitryspin deficiency who
kept her test results secret).
187. Diver & Cohen, supra note 136, at 1443 (stating that a “common basis for
apprehension stems from a fear that information about one’s genetic profile[ ] will be disclosed
to others without one’s consent and will then be used to one’s personal disadvantage”).
188. Roberts, supra note 27, at 603.
189. See id. at 616; see also Kim, supra note 19, at 1537.
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Among the fundamental reasons for protecting genetic privacy is
bypassing genetic-information discrimination.190 Aware of these and
similar kinds of concerns, Congress concluded, “Federal legislation
establishing a national and uniform basic standard is necessary to
fully protect the public from discrimination and allay their concerns
about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals
to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new
therapies.”191 Congress passed GINA to protect against genetic-
information discrimination and to assuage anxieties regarding the
potential for such discrimination.192 
Because the fears related to invasions of genetic privacy simulta-
neously implicate the fears related to genetic-information discrimi-
nation, Congress’s incorporation of a privacy provision into GINA’s
antidiscrimination protections addresses the bifurcated nature of
those concerns.193 Section 202(b) prohibits requesting, requiring, or
purchasing genetic information, thus outlawing unauthorized dis-
closure, whereas section 202(a) forbids discriminatory actions on the
basis of that information. Like the underlying anxieties, the
associated legal protections also have dual elements. As a result,
GINA’s privacy provision has a clear antidiscrimination objective
beyond preventing unwelcome access to genetic information.
The relevance of Congress’s intent in drafting GINA is twofold.
On a general level, the unequivocally antidiscrimination purpose of
the legislation demonstrates that Congress itself understood how
privacy and antidiscrimination are conceptually linked, and that
privacy law may function to prevent discrimination. Otherwise, it
would not have placed a provision that structurally conforms to the
privacy law paradigm in a subsection devoted to outlawing discrimi-
nation. GINA’s legislative history therefore supports two of this
Article’s central claims: (1) privacy and antidiscrimination are re-
lated concepts and, at times, related types of legal protections and
190. See Diver & Cohen, supra note 136, at 1445.
191. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2(5), 122
Stat. 881, 882 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (2012)).
192. I have previously argued that in passing GINA, Congress acted with both research and
antidiscrimination motivations. See Roberts, supra note 135, at 471.
193. See Kim, supra note 115, at 700 (noting that “the key to preventing discrimination
based on genetic traits lies in protecting the privacy of genetic information” and that
“Congress recognized this reality, and therefore GINA also seeks to protect the privacy of
genetic information”).
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(2) GINA provides a real-world example of privacy doing the work
of antidiscrimination.
In addition to Congress, legal scholars have acknowledged the
potential benefits privacy law may have for antidiscrimination,194
specifically with respect to genetic information.195 For example,
writing about GINA, Bradley Areheart has called privacy and anti-
classification “natural allies” because “[i]f consideration of a trait is
forbidden, there is no need to disclose information pertaining to the
trait.”196 Although Areheart acknowledged the linkage between
these two concepts, he focused on how GINA’s robust privacy protec-
tions could actually hinder the statute’s antidiscrimination pur-
pose.197 Similarly, prior to GINA, Radhika Rao asserted that
“privacy and equality are linked, at least in the genetic context, and
that protecting genetic privacy may serve as a mechanism to ensure
a measure of genetic equality.”198 According to Rao, “[t]he only sure-
fire way to prevent genetic discrimination is to safeguard genetic
privacy—to construct a veil of genetic ignorance around each indi-
vidual.”199 Thus, she acknowledged a pre-GINA iteration of this ap-
proach. Lastly, as mentioned, Pauline Kim took the perspective that
exactly complements this Article. She asserted that autonomy, the
value most readily associated with privacy itself, is actually the
core value behind arguments against genetic-information discrimin-
ation.200 Kim did not advocate privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis
so much as a paradigm shift from antidiscrimination to privacy.201
Although legal academics have acknowledged the privacy/antidis-
194. But see Strahilevitz, supra note 100, at 364 (arguing that intrusions into personal
privacy might be necessary to bypass statistical discrimination, as entities will rely on group
stereotypes when individual information is not available to them).
195. See, e.g., Scott Burris & Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic Screening from a Public Health
Perspective: Some Lessons from the HIV Experience, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra note 25, at 137, 151 (“In both the HIV
and genetic realms, privacy has been used as a proxy for antidiscrimination protection,
particularly in insurance. That is, the role of the law is not to prevent the collection or proper
use of the information but rather to prevent its falling into the wrong hands and being used
to deprive the subject of a job, service, or insurance.”).
196. Areheart, supra note 115, at 710.
197. See id. at 712.
198. Radhika Rao, A Veil of Genetic Ignorance? Protecting Genetic Privacy to Ensure
Equality, 51 VILL. L. REV. 827, 829-30 (2006).
199. Id. at 831.
200. Kim, supra note 19, at 1537.
201. See id.
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crimination symbiosis when protecting genetic information, this
Article is the first to expand this potentially powerful relationship
to advocate for the better protection for other antidiscrimination
categories.
Finally, it is worth again reiterating that protecting privacy to
prevent discrimination favors the anticlassification principle. By
using strong privacy protections as a vehicle of antidiscrimination,
GINA adopts a “genome-blind” approach.202 But preventing all
access to information related to protected status undermines an
employer’s ability to use that information for positive differential
treatment, such as reasonable accommodations and diversity ini-
tiatives. Furthermore, it could create pressures for individuals to
underplay their protected status and to conform to majoritarian
norms. Part III will explore the full implications of using privacy to
combat discrimination. It notes where the anticlassification and
antisubordination perspectives diverge, and addresses the weak-
nesses of privacy law as antidiscrimination law in the process.
              
* * * 
     
GINA provides an excellent illustration of the practical break-
down of privacy/antidiscrimination essentialism. Section 202 con-
tains both a typical antidiscrimination protection, modeled on Title
VII, and a largely unprecedented prohibition on requesting, requir-
ing, or purchasing genetic information.203 These subparts could be
understood as distinct and offering protections that are different in
kind; instead, this Article asserts that GINA’s privacy provision is
not distinct from the statute’s antidiscrimination protections, but
rather a key aspect of them. It is an example of a law that simulta-
neously incorporates both kinds of protections in its attempt to
thwart systematic disadvantage. Congress was well aware of the
utility of using privacy law to stop discrimination when drafting
GINA’s section 202.204 The privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis is
therefore not mere scholarly speculation but an actual, real-world
202. Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW &
INEQUALITY 429, 456 (2007); see also Roberts, supra note 27, at 622. 
203. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202(a)(1)-
(2), 122 Stat. 881, 907 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2012)).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 176-82.
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legislative strategy that has already been openly employed in at
least one federal antidiscrimination law. The following Part will out-
line the potential of privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis in other
zones of antidiscrimination protection.
III. THE PRIVACY/ANTIDISCRIMINATION SYMBIOSIS ANALYZED
This Article’s central assertion is that privacy law can do the
work of antidiscrimination. With that intention in mind, I have
challenged privacy/antidiscrimination essentialism on both theoreti-
cal and practical levels. Part I demonstrated the conceptual con-
nection between privacy and antidiscrimination, introducing the
privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis. Part II looked to GINA as an
example of how lawmakers might harness the power of privacy law
to combat discrimination. In Part III, the Article turns to the prac-
tical implications of using privacy law as a tool for antidiscrimina-
tion beyond the realm of genetic information.
Currently, the law forbids employers from discriminating on the
basis of a variety of attributes: race, color, ethnicity, national origin,
religion, sex, age, and disability.205 Discrimination based on several
of these protected statuses requires knowing specific information.
For instance, even though an employer may be able to make basic
inferences about an employee’s age, ethnicity, or national origin,
specific knowledge of those protected statuses requires additional
information. Although an employer may guess that an employee is
in her forties and from South America, the employer cannot know
that the employee is forty-four years old and from Chile without ac-
quiring more facts. Likewise, although some religions have associat-
ed visual cues, such as clothing or grooming practices, others remain
unknown without further inquiry. Yet even for those protected stat-
uses that are more readily knowable, privacy law still may be of use
in certain circumstances. For example, an individual’s race is not
always detectable through personal interaction. Forbidding an
employer from asking a racially ambiguous employee about her race
could, therefore, prevent discrimination. Moreover, not everyone
205. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
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with a disability uses a wheelchair or a cane. Millions of people have
hidden disabilities that are not obvious upon an initial meeting.206
Finally, gender ambiguity exists. Thus, privacy law could prevent
an employer from inquiring about an employee’s sex, a safeguard
that could be of particular utility if an individual has undergone
gender reassignment. Put simply, privacy protections can stop
discrimination whenever the protected status is not completely
known to the potential discriminator. 
Privacy, when applicable, offers certain clear advantages as an
antidiscrimination strategy. First, recovering for privacy violations
tends to be simpler procedurally than obtaining relief under ordi-
nary antidiscrimination laws. Second, privacy law intervenes at an
earlier point in the process of discrimination, thereby limiting the
scope of the harms that the wronged employee might experience.
Although current best practices might advise employers to avoid
probing questions at the hiring stage, individuals currently enjoy
little protection against such inquiries once employed. Using privacy
to prevent potential discriminators from accessing information re-
lated to protected status would add an additional layer of antidis-
crimination protection.
Even though privacy law offers substantial benefits, it also has
its limitations. To begin, privacy law may at times overprotect the
information in question, leading people to fail to disclose when it
would be beneficial to them or to society as a whole. Further, legis-
latures and courts have at times been reluctant to provide protec-
tion or relief for privacy violations that do not inflict an associated
harm. Thankfully, however, antidiscrimination’s strengths could
help to mitigate privacy’s weaknesses. Linking antidiscrimination
to privacy could provide an added incentive for lawmakers to safe-
guard sensitive information. Additionally, in the case of overpro-
tection, pairing privacy protections with antidiscrimination goals,
particularly those associated with antisubordination, could encour-
age disclosure for accommodation or consciousness-raising purposes.
Thus, privacy law supports antidiscrimination purposes, and
antidiscrimination purposes may similarly support privacy law.
206. See generally Alecia M. Santuzzi et al., Invisible Disabilities: Unique Challenges for
Employees and Organizations, 7 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 204 (2014). The preva-
lence of invisible disabilities explains the utility of the ADA’s privacy provision.
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A. Beyond Genetic Information
Privacy law can only undermine discrimination when the
protected status is unknown to the potential discriminator. Because
traditional antidiscrimination categories often have associated
visual or sociocultural cues, employers can frequently ascertain
information about protected status through casual observation. As
a practical matter, antidiscrimination protections have focused on
outlawing discriminatory conduct (specifically when there is an
intent to discriminate) because the relevant underlying information
was readily available.207 Although laws banning discriminatory
conduct offer some protection, employers may make both conscious
and unconscious decisions based on this information, regardless of
the law. Importantly, despite the existence of legal protection,
discrimination on the basis of the protected categories still persists.
At first blush, privacy law’s ability to thwart discrimination may
be unclear. Certainly, genetic information differs from other
antidiscrimination categories in key ways. As noted, obtaining
genetic information about an individual frequently requires taking
a test, whereas obtaining information about other legally protected
statuses (for example, race, gender, and disability) does not.208 Con-
sequently, privacy law would seem to do far more for genetic
information than it possibly could for other protected statuses. But
this initial reaction underestimates the potential of privacy law to
undermine discrimination. Information related to many antidis-
crimination categories regularly remains unknown to employers
absent further inquiry.
For example, in Mitchell v. Champ Sports, the plaintiff, who self-
identified as a black woman, had light skin.209 Her supervisor as-
sumed she was white.210 When black friends and relatives visited
her at work, her supervisor was surprised to discover that the
plaintiff did, in fact, consider herself black.211 Following that rev-
elation, her supervisor demoted her to part-time associate despite
207. See Kim, supra note 19, at 1537.
208. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 623-24.
209. 42 F. Supp. 2d 642, 645 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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her highly positive performance reviews, leading her to sue under
Title VII.212 
Similar kinds of scenarios occur with respect to other antidiscrim-
ination categories, such as national origin or ethnicity. For example,
in 2007, an arbitration panel required Merrill Lynch, the world’s
largest brokerage firm, to pay a former broker $400,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $1.2 million in punitive damages.213 The
broker had worked for Merrill Lynch as a financial advisor for nine
years, held a clean record, and was being considered for a career in
management, when he was abruptly fired and his reputation was
intentionally tarnished after his branch director discovered, over a
lunch conversation, that the broker was of Iranian descent.214
Employers have also discriminated against employees upon learn-
ing of those employees’ religious beliefs. In 2011, a former employee
of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, who received
excellent reviews and compliments from her co-workers and super-
visors, sued under state and federal antidiscrimination law because
she was unexpectedly terminated only a few days after revealing
her deeply held religious beliefs during a conversation with her
immediate supervisor.215 Similarly, in Florida, two married former
teachers filed a complaint against their school district alleging that
the district’s principal discriminated against them after they reveal-
ed that they were Jehovah’s Witnesses.216 The couple had previously
received positive reviews and praise at work.217 Most recently, a
212. Id.
213. See Merrill Fined for Discrimination Against Iranian Broker, N.Y.  TIMES DEAL-
BOOK (July 24, 2007, 7:25 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/merrill-fined-for-
discrimination-against-iranian-broker/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/3NA7-KP3X]; see also Amended
Award NASD Dispute Resolution at 2-3, Zojaji v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
(July 19, 2009), available at http://perma.cc/9UZY-FW7M.
214. Amended Award NASD Dispute Resolution, supra note 213, at 3.
215. Complaint at 2, Vaughan v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm., No. 6:11-CV-00199-
JKG (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2011); see also Michelle Massey, Woman Files Religious Discrim-
ination Lawsuit over Alleged Voodoo Curse, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC. (May 2, 2011, 4:28 PM),
http://setexasrecord.com/news/235187-woman-files-religious-discrimination-lawsuit-over-
alleged-voodoo-curse [http://perma.cc/JZ9P-RHB9].
216. Complaint at 3-4, 6, Rosales v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cnty., No. 2:12-CV-00454-JES-DNF
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2012); see also Sabina Bhasin, Former Teachers, Jehovah’s Witnesses File
Discrimination Lawsuit Against School District, NAPLES NEWS DAILY (Aug. 30, 2012, 5:05
AM), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2012/aug/30/former-teachers-jehovahs-witnesses-file-
lawsuit [http://perma.cc/AJX-5F3P].
217. Complaint at 4, Rosales, No. 2:12-CV-00454-JES-DNF.
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pastor brought hostile work environment and wrongful termination
claims against his former employer based on the actions of his re-
gional manager once that manager learned of the pastor’s religious
activities.218
Privacy law can even preempt discrimination on the basis of sex
or gender in certain circumstances. In Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging
& Diagnostic Group, the plaintiff, although biologically male, was
living her life as a woman.219 She had successfully applied for a job
with a medical clinic, pending a background check and drug test.220
Although she passed both, her prospective employer withdrew its
offer when the background check revealed the plaintiff had been
born a man.221 She then sued pursuant to Title VII.222
Likewise, plaintiffs have experienced discrimination after their
employers learned of their age. For example, one plaintiff, who had
been actively recruited by her employer for a position as a bank
teller, was fired five days after a human resources representative
asked her, “You’re not sixty-five, are you?,” when the representative
learned the plaintiff was on Medicare.223 One of her arguments in
response to the bank’s assertion that she was underperforming was
that the bank did not similarly discharge younger employees with
identical performance issues.224
Finally, even with the ADA’s mild privacy provisions, information
related to a previously unknown disability can also lead to discrim-
ination at work. For instance, a county prison was employing a
licensed practical nurse, who was undergoing treatment for depres-
sion and anxiety.225 Because she did not require an accommodation,
218. Complaint at 2, Calame v. Aarons, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00441-DRH-DGW (S.D. Ill. June
17, 2013); see also Ann Maher, Religious Discrimination Suit Against Aaron’s Removed to
Federal Court, MADISON-ST. CLAIR REC. (May 21, 2013), http://madisonrecord.com/issues/893-
retaliatory-discharge/255832-religious-discrimination-suit-against-aarons-removed-to-federal-
court [http://perma.cc/7488-9M4N].
219. 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
220. Id. at 656.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Rubel v. Century Bancshares, Inc., No. Civ.02-482(MJD/JGL), 2004 WL 114942, at *1-
2 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2004).
224. Id. at *4.
225. Weaver v. McKean, No. 11-254 Eire, 2012 WL 1564661, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2012)
(magistrate’s recommendation adopted by No. 1:11-cv-254-SJM-SPB, 2012 WL 1564617 (W.D.
Pa. May 3, 2012)).
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she did not disclose her conditions to her employer.226 However,
when she began taking additional medication for attention deficit
disorder and started suffering side effects as a result, her employer
asked her what medications she was taking, then put her on
administrative leave and eventually fired her.227
The employers in these cases obtained previously unknown infor-
mation regarding the plaintiffs’ protected statuses, which they then
used as the basis for discrimination. For example, in Lopez, if the
information related to her sex had been considered private, it could
have been redacted from her background check, thereby limiting her
employer’s ability to discriminate on the basis of her gender.
Symphony auditions provide another meaningful—albeit tempor-
ary—example of how restricting access to information related to a
protected status can bypass certain kinds of discrimination. His-
torically, women faced significant disadvantages in being hired to
symphony orchestras. As of 1970, roughly 10 percent of orchestra
members were women.228 When orchestras introduced blind au-
ditions by having prospective members play behind screens, the
number of female musicians increased to 35 percent by the mid-
1990s.229 Researchers have attributed a significant portion of these
gains to the blind audition process.230 Although female musicians
would be hard pressed to conceal their gender once joining the
orchestras, the blind auditions demonstrate how obscuring infor-
mation related to a protected status can help eliminate disparities,
at least at the hiring stage. GINA, and the ADA in a more limited
capacity, already includes a privacy protection designed to bypass
future discrimination. But the cases described above, as well as the
proven benefit of sex-blind symphony auditions, demonstrate the
potential for the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis in other
contexts. Prohibiting requests for information related to race, sex,
ethnicity, national origin, religion, age, or disability could bypass
discrimination in at least some instances. Congress might therefore
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind”
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 717 (2000); see also Marilyn Mark,
Blind Auditions Key to Hiring Musicians, PRINCETON WKLY. BULL. (Princeton Univ., Prince-
ton, N.J.), Feb. 12, 2001, at 7, available at http://perma.cc/B2A6-B6QQ.
229. Goldin & Rouse, supra note 228, at 738; see also Mark, supra note 228.
230. See Goldin & Rouse, supra note 228, at 738; see also Mark, supra note 228.
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consider adding a prohibition against such inquiries to Title VII and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as well as
strengthening the protections of the ADA.
B. Privacy’s Advantages
Part I outlined the process of discrimination and explained how
even unintentional conduct may undermine antidiscrimination’s
goals of equality and fairness. At present, however, much of employ-
ment discrimination law fails to adequately cover several kinds of
employer conduct that ultimately result in systematic disadvantage.
Many individuals report experiencing discrimination at work, but
legal relief lies frustratingly out of reach. For example, an employee
may feel that an employer treats her differently on the basis of her
national origin by reprimanding her more severely for lateness or by
giving her less favorable performance reviews. Although the employ-
ee herself may be convinced that she was the object of discrimina-
tion—and, based on social cognition theory, she likely was—she has
little chance of prevailing in court.231
The nature of discrimination is changing. When Title VII (the par-
adigmatic piece of employment discrimination legislation) passed in
1964, individuals faced clear and intentional exclusion.232 Although
deliberate discrimination may persist, today’s most common genre
of discrimination is of the subtle, cumulative variety.233 Con-
sequently, Title VII and many of the subsequent laws based on its
protections are ill-suited for addressing the most pervasive variety
of discrimination happening today.234 Current antidiscrimination
law falls short in at least two ways: (1) it frequently requires plain-
tiffs to demonstrate that their employers had an intent to discrimi-
nate, or that the employer had no other plausible reason for the
231. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 71, at 1162 (describing an “unremarkable” Title VII case
in which her client, the only nonwhite employee at a factory, believed he had suffered
discrimination in a variety of subtle ways); see also Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking
Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 71 (2011) (explaining that employees “report
incidents that would not be legally cognizable under current [antidiscrimination] frameworks
but that are arguably discriminatory within the statutory language”).
232. See Krieger, supra note 71, at 1164, 1241.
233. See id. at 1241; Sperino, supra note 231, at 84-85; Sturm, supra note 90, at 459-61.
234. Krieger, supra note 71, at 1241; see also Sperino, supra note 231, at 71, 84-85; Sturm,
supra note 90, at 459-61.
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adverse employment action; and (2) it focuses on large-scale events
such as hiring and firing but ignores the smaller, more subtle kinds
of differential treatment that culminate in disadvantage over time.
Sadly, judicial stagnation appears at the root of ordinary
antidiscrimination law’s current shortfalls. Discrimination itself
has evolved since the 1960s, but courts have been reluctant to
reflect those changes in their interpretations of the law.235 As a
result, courts have tended to ignore potentially meritorious
claims.236 Further, this narrow conception of what courts consider
an antidiscrimination violation has far-reaching effects. Because
judges are limited in their viewpoints regarding what constitutes
actionable discrimination, lawyers have adopted a similarly re-
stricted perspective, leading them to ignore cases where there is
true disadvantage but relief is unlikely.237 The result is that exist-
ing law is largely ineffective. To return to the legislative triad from
Part I, ordinary antidiscrimination protections fail to achieve their
purpose of promoting fairness and equality. 
While current antidiscrimination legislation may seek to pre-
vent the harmful impacts of unconscious, small-scale discrimina-
tion, the shortfalls of ordinary antidiscrimination laws are well-
documented.238 Antidiscrimination advocates are in need of new
235. See Krieger, supra note 71, at 1241; Sperino, supra note 231, at 81-82.
236. Sperino argues that the judicially imposed frameworks squeeze out potentially
cognizable claims in two ways:
First, even when a plaintiff ’s theory of the case fits within recognized categories
of discrimination, the claim may be rejected if it does not fit neatly within an
accepted rubric. This happens, in part, because the rubrics often fail to reflect
the language of the discrimination statutes. And in many cases, courts do not
question whether the rubrics ask the correct questions. Second, the frameworks
allow courts to implicitly reject new theories of discrimination without explicitly
considering their merits.
Sperino, supra note 231, at 86.
237. Sperino describes this phenomenon as “path dependence.” She explains:
This path dependence is especially troubling because it has effects outside of the
courtroom. Many practicing lawyers also view discrimination through the
frameworks, either because they have a formalistic view of the law that situates
the frameworks as the definition of discrimination or because they believe it is
futile or too costly to litigate against them. When litigants begin to frame their
discrimination complaints, they do so within the accepted discrimination frame-
works.
Id. at 108.
238. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 978 (explaining that “legal rules might seek
to reduce the likelihood that implicit bias will produce differential outcomes; but it would be
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tools.239 Privacy law offers two key advantages for combating
discrimination. First, plaintiffs who have experienced discrimin-
ation may encounter substantial difficulty when proving their
claims, especially with regard to discriminatory intent. Proving a
violation of privacy is, by contrast, much easier because intent is
irrelevant. Second, because privacy law is preemptive—it renders
the subsequent discrimination impossible by intervening at the
differentiation stage. Thus, using privacy law for antidiscrimination
purposes limits the scope of possible harm. An employee can chal-
lenge an attempt at prying, and potentially bypass the adverse
employment action that could follow, instead of being forced to wait
for a discriminatory event to occur to obtain relief. Privacy laws
therefore present clear advantages for preventing discrimination.
1. Elimination of Proof of Employer Mindset
To start, employment discrimination claims are notoriously
difficult to prove because plaintiffs often find themselves in the
position of attempting to establish the mindset of their alleged
discriminator. The Supreme Court famously stated that Title VII is
not “a general civility code,” meaning that employment discrimina-
tion statutes do not require employers or fellow employees to be
nice; the laws merely provide that employers may not discriminate
on the enumerated bases.240 Consequently, an employer may law-
fully choose not to hire or promote the most qualified person for any
number of reasons, including simply if the employer does not like
her. Given the near infinite number of potentially acceptable rea-
sons for most employment decisions, to establish an actionable
violation, a plaintiff must frequently show that the employer used
the protected status as the basis for its decision.241 Plaintiffs, there-
quite different to conclude that current antidiscrimination law adequately achieves this goal”).
239. See Sperino, supra note 231, at 82-83 (“Sex and race discrimination are unfortunately
still present, and discrimination law must remain nimble enough to adapt to the ever-
changing contours of the workplace.”).
240. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
241. See id. Notably, there are exceptions to this statement. Although an individual may
struggle to establish a particular employment decision was made on the basis of a protected
status, employment discrimination cases may proceed when litigants are able to demonstrate
that the employer, or one of its policies, categorically excludes members of a protected class.
For example, in pattern or practice disparate treatment cases, claimants can present
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fore, find themselves in the position of needing to establish their
employers’ mindset as a crucial element of their cases.
As noted, the primary focus of this Article is disparate treatment
cases—cases in which the employer treated its employees differently
on the basis of protected status—regardless of whether that differ-
ential treatment was intentional or even conscious. Yet although
scholars have acknowledged that conscious intent may not be
necessary for disparate treatment,242 courts have focused on
discriminatory motive as a key aspect of these cases.243 With respect
to Title VII, the current claim structure is predicated on the notion
that employers who discriminate had the intent to do so, and that
absent such an intent, those employers would act rationally and
without bias.244 Courts have equated causation and intent in Title
VII disparate treatment cases.245 They “must either find that the
decision maker intended to discriminate or that no discrimination
occurred.”246
However, proving intent in employment discrimination cases is
no easy task.247 One reason for this difficulty is the availability of
nondiscriminatory explanations for the challenged conduct.248 For
instance, to answer an allegation of discrimination, the employer
may only need to establish a believable alternate rationale for its
actions. Although Title VII plaintiffs can bring “mixed-motive”
cases— lawsuits that combine both proper and improper reasons for
employment decisions—they must establish that the forbidden stat-
us was a motivating factor by a preponderance of the evidence.249
Thus, both single- and mixed-motive cases require plaintiffs to
statistical evidence. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). Similarly,
when a facially neutral policy disparately impacts a protected class, plaintiffs do not have to
establish intent. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1977). However, as
explained in Part I, this Article focuses on ordinary disparate impact claims, not pattern or
practice claims.
242. See Krieger, supra note 71, at 1241.
243. For a discussion of this line of cases, see supra notes 209-27 and accompanying text.
244. See Krieger, supra note 71, at 1212; Sperino, supra note 231, at 85.
245. See Krieger, supra note 71, at 1169.
246. Id. at 1170, 1178-79, 1181.
247. See id. at 1177.
248. See id. at 1178.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). However, the Supreme Court recently held that
plaintiffs bringing Title VII retaliation claims must establish but-for causation. See Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2520 (2013).
2015] PROTECTING PRIVACY TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION 2151
establish intent.250 Further, if the employer can establish that it
would have arrived at the same decision regardless of the protected
attribute, the plaintiff may not be eligible for damages, such as back
pay, or for court-mandated employment actions, such as hiring,
promotion, or reinstatement.251
Different antidiscrimination statutes treat the role of the
discriminator’s mindset differently. The ADEA’s doctrine evolved
separately from Title VII.252 Although Title VII allows for mixed-
motive claims, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who are
alleging a disparate treatment claim under the ADEA must
establish that age was the but-for cause of the adverse employment
action.253 Consequently, intent requirements seem to have an argu-
ably stronger impact in these cases. Additionally, the ADA also has
its own line of jurisprudence related to intent. Although the statute
covers both intentional and unintentional discrimination,254 the
causation element remains unclear. That is to say, courts have not
settled whether plaintiffs can recover for mixed-motive claims, as in
Title VII claims, or whether they must establish but-for causation,
as in the ADEA claims.255 Hence, even though ADEA and ADA
litigants may not need to establish intent in the same way as their
Title VII disparate treatment counterparts, requiring but-for causa-
tion also puts a substantial burden on the plaintiff.
Given the central role of intent in all of these cases, it can be rel-
atively easy for an employer to defend an allegation of discrimina-
tion. Imagine that the only applicant of color for a particular job also
went to the hiring chair’s rival school, as in the USC/UCLA exam-
ple.256 Returning to the analysis from Part I, while institutional
250. Krieger, supra note 71, at 1171.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
252. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009) (“[B]ecause Title VII is mater-
ially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion ... [Title VII] decisions do not
control our construction of the ADEA.”).
253. Id. at 176.
254. LARSON ET AL., supra note 92, § 156.04.
255. The ADA, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, may allow mixed-motive cases. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that an ADA
plaintiff “must show only that disability played a motivating role in the [employer’s]
decision”). Compare Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2520-21 (2013)
(arguably leaving the door open for ADA mixed-motive claims), with Lewis v. Humboldt
Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (applying Gross to the ADA).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
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loyalty may not be a “good” reason to fail to promote a qualified
applicant, it is also not a discriminatory one. Because no two
employees or applicants are completely identical with the exception
of the relevant protected status, litigants frequently have difficulty
proving their claims because they lack a perfect comparison (that is,
a nonminority candidate with identical educational credentials),
making it challenging to establish that the alleged discriminatory
motive was even a factor in the decision.257 Regardless of the true
motivation, the employer could point to the employee’s education or
almost any factor besides her race to justify its decision. Moreover,
all employees make mistakes. In many instances, an employer will
be able to find some reason for an adverse employment action if the
employer looks hard enough.258
The subtle, unconscious nature of much of modern discrimination
is yet another stumbling block for plaintiffs who must prove
discriminatory intent. At present, disparate treatment that results
from unconscious bias must adhere to the same claim structure as
disparate treatment that results from conscious intent.259 The
current law does not recognize the biasing effect that normal human
cognition could have on employers’ decision making,260 creating a
substantial disconnect between the lived experience of discrimina-
tion and the legal protection designed to stop it.261
Not only do ordinary antidiscrimination statutes fail employees,
they also fail employers by forbidding conduct entrenched in the
process of human cognition. Under the current regime, an employer
who wishes not to discriminate will be powerless to reach that goal.
As explained in Part I, the cognitive processes responsible for many
instances of present-day disparate treatment are more than simply
adaptive—they are crucial for humans to be able to function effec-
tively in their environments.262 Moreover, people frequently fail to
truly understand why we do what we do. Studies show that most
257. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728,
731 (2011).
258. Krieger, supra note 71, at 1178.
259. Id. at 1164-65.
260. Id. at 1167.
261. Krieger asserts that the focus on discriminatory motivation creates “a substantial
discontinuity between the jurisprudential construction of discrimination and the real life
phenomenon it purports to represent.” Id. at 1165.
262. Id. at 1239.
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individuals remain largely unaware of their own mental processes
and are surprisingly poor at identifying the causes for their
actions.263 Consequently, employers will rarely be consciously aware
of the actual reasons for their hiring, firing, and promotion deci-
sions.264 The deeply embedded cognitive processes related to differ-
entiation, categorization, and stereotyping, combined with the lack
of access to our true reasons for acting, reveal an unfortunate reali-
ty. In many cases, employers could not stop discriminating even if
they wanted to. A person can only avoid discriminating if she can
identify why she is doing what she does in the first place.265 A
decision maker who self-identifies as “blind” to the various protected
statuses will still engage in the basic human cognitive processes
that produce bias without even knowing it.266 Given her conscious
intent not to discriminate combined with her ignorance with respect
to her cognitive functioning, that individual would likely be sur-
prised and perhaps deeply offended at the notion that she had
discriminated against another person.267 Krieger explains that,
when read against an understanding of human cognitive function:
A legal duty which admonishes people simply not to consider
race, national origin, or gender harkens to Dostoevsky’s problem
of the polar bear: “Try ... not to think of a polar bear, and you
will see that the cursed thing will come to mind every minute.”
For reasons this anecdote makes plain, the “color-blindness”
approach to the nondiscrimination duty embodied in current
disparate treatment jurisprudence cannot succeed in eliminating
category-based judgment errors and thus cannot effectuate equal
opportunity.268
Ordinary antidiscrimination statutes face significant challenges in
identifying and addressing the disadvantages generated by today’s
predominant form of discrimination.269 
263. Id. at 1214.
264. Id. at 1215.
265. Id. at 1186 (“One can refrain from ‘discriminating’ only to the extent that one can
accurately identify the factors inducing one’s actions and decisions.”).
266. Id. at 1217.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1240.
269. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 976.
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Privacy law has distinct advantages as a legal strategy for
combating discrimination. Unlike the burden of establishing an
employer’s mindset found in ordinary antidiscrimination laws, de-
monstrating that an employer attempted to obtain a certain kind of
information is markedly easier. It is a straightforward factual in-
quiry instead of an attempt to divine a potential discriminator’s true
intent, to the exclusion of all other possible explanations.270
The first GINA case settled by the EEOC illustrates this very
point. The claimant held a temporary clerk position with her em-
ployer.271 However, when she applied for permanent employment,
the company extended her an offer contingent on a preplacement
medical examination.272 During the evaluation, the medical exam-
iner asked the claimant for her family history of a number of
conditions and tested her for carpal tunnel syndrome.273 Despite her
personal physician’s determination to the contrary, the employer
rescinded its offer based on its medical examiner’s diagnosis of
carpal tunnel syndrome.274 In establishing her GINA claim, she did
not have to establish why she was denied employment or whether
that denial was appropriate, just that the employer made an inquiry
related to her genetic information by asking for her family
history.275 GINA’s less onerous standards for proving a privacy
violation smoothed this litigant’s path to recovery. This example
suggests that privacy claims may have a practical benefit, as they
are easier to establish than their antidiscrimination counterparts.
Specifically, by stopping discrimination at the differentiation stage,
before the discriminatory conduct has the chance to occur, privacy
law eliminates the need for plaintiffs to establish intent. Moreover,
employers do not need to worry that an individual’s protected status
might unconsciously influence their decisions because they do not
270. See Corbett, supra note 19, at 9; see also Kim, supra note 19, at 1543; Kim, supra note
115, at 700.
271. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Fabricut to Pay $50,000 to
Settle EEOC Disability and Genetic Information Lawsuit (May 7, 2013) [hereinafter EEOC
Press Release], available at http://perma.cc/VGJ6-W5XX.
272. Complaint at 4-5, EEOC v. Fabricut, Inc., No. 14:13-CV-00248-CVE-PJC, 2013 WL
3058660 (N.D. Okla. May 7, 2013).
273. Id.
274. EEOC Press Release, supra note 271.
275. The claimant also raised an ADA claim, for which she would have had to establish
that she was denied the position on the basis of a disability. See Complaint, supra note 272,
at 4.
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have the information in the first place. Privacy law therefore targets
conscious and unconscious biases alike, in a way that ordinary
antidiscrimination law cannot.
2. Preemption
Preempting adverse employment actions of all types and degrees
is yet another advantage to intervening at the differentiation stage.
Ordinary employment discrimination statutes focus on large-scale
workplace events, like hiring and firing, leaving smaller scale
incidents, such as social exclusion and negative performance evalua-
tions, largely not actionable.276 However, this limited scope of pro-
tection fails to reflect the lived experience of potential plaintiffs, for
whom minor, everyday slights can be genuinely damaging.277 Thus,
certain assumptions related to the nature of what constitutes true
harm are embedded in the current law. Particularly, it assumes that
the small, cumulative types of disadvantage that may flow from
cognitive biases are not truly harmful. Because of this assumption,
plaintiffs must experience a specific, large-scale kind of harm before
suing.278 An employee who has reason to believe a protected status
affected the assessment of her work can do little to rectify the harm
she has experienced.279 Because ordinary antidiscrimination stat-
utes fail to capture small-scale adverse employment actions, em-
ployees who are currently facing such discrimination must find a
new job, endure the biased differential treatment, or wait until a
large-scale event finally occurs. None of these outcomes is desirable.
Lawmakers should consider ways to discourage adverse differential
276. Sperino, supra note 231, at 103-04.
277. See id. at 84 (describing these little insults as “microaggressions”).
278. Id. at 85.
279. For example:
The plaintiff cannot prevail on her individual disparate treatment claim because
receiving two negative evaluations (without a corresponding compensation
decision) does not create a cognizable adverse employment action. She might
wait until she was denied a management position and then sue, but few [people]
are likely to invest their human capital in such an endeavor. Even if the
evaluation results in a discriminatory compensation decision, the plaintiff may
be unable to convince the court that some or all of her evidence is connected to
that decision.
Id. at 93.
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treatment of all shapes and sizes yet without putting too much of a
burden on employers.
By intervening at the point of differentiation, privacy law could
preempt subsequent large- and small-scale harms alike. This strat-
egy is desirable because it offers employees protections against all
kinds of workplace harms, yet avoids overregulating the day-to-day
operation of employers. Critics of using privacy law for antidis-
crimination might assert that adding those protections to existing
employment discrimination legislation is ultimately unnecessary
because such protections arguably already exist. Although not rising
to the level of the symphony auditions described above, employers
remain somewhat “blind,” because they rarely ask applicants ques-
tions related to protected status. This norm against asking devel-
oped as best practice because, should a particular applicant not be
hired after answering questions related to her race, age, or intent
to start a family, such inquiries could be viewed as evidence of
discrimination.280 Surely something is better than nothing, so a
widely accepted convention against asking about protected status
does some work to avoid the potential for future discrimination.
However, it falls short in at least two ways. First, it does not carry
the force of law. Although it may be bad form to inquire into an
applicant’s protected status, in many jurisdictions it is perfectly
legal.281 Second, the norm against asking is most present at the
hiring stage, leaving individuals who are already employed, such as
the majority of the cases described above, vulnerable to prying by
their employers.
C. Privacy’s Disadvantages
Although privacy has some clear advantages as a vehicle to avert
discrimination, it also has its drawbacks. Strong prohibitions on
requesting or requiring information pertaining to protected status
280. See, e.g., 2 FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 16:2 (2014); GUIDE TO HR POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES MANUALS app. § 2.I1 (2013); 1 POLICIES AND PRACTICES § 38:6 (2014).
281. However, some states prohibit pre-employment inquiries into protected status. Those
states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois (by regulation),
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See generally LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
SCREENING (Matthew Bender 2014).
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could undermine antidiscrimination objectives by impeding person-
ally and socially beneficial disclosures. Furthermore, judges and
legislators may be hesitant to provide privacy protections generally,
given the notion that the associated harms are solely dignitary.
1. Hindrance of Beneficial Disclosures
Privacy may at times overprotect. Returning to the concepts of
anticlassification and antisubordination is helpful here. As explain-
ed in Part I, these principles represent two distinct variations on the
proper goal of the American antidiscrimination project.282 Anti-
classification holds that no distinction on the basis of a protected
trait is desirable, whereas antisubordination maintains that positive
differential treatment is warranted when it combats previous social
disadvantage. Anticlassification would always support nondisclo-
sure or blindness, whereas antisubordination would require access
to information related to protected status to facilitate affirmative
action.
Because antisubordination efforts may require disclosure, pro-
tecting privacy can at times stand in the way of addressing disad-
vantage. Importantly, antidiscrimination notions of equality and
fairness do not always mandate identical treatment. Recall the
perhaps counterintuitive notion that we must at times treat people
differently to treat them equally or fairly.283 Although this Article
has criticized the ADA’s privacy provision as being unduly permis-
sive post-hiring, too strong a privacy protection for disability status
might stand in the way of furthering disability rights by interfering
with the accommodation process. Pursuant to the statute’s imple-
menting regulations, the employee requesting the accommodation
and the employer may need to engage in an “interactive process” to
allow full consideration of the concerns of both parties.284 A blanket
282. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text (distinguishing between the
anticlassification and antisubordination readings of the antidiscrimination principle).
283. Given the potential salience of genetic information to our daily lives, I have previously
asserted that “allowing entities to consider genetic information might actually lead to more
meaningful equality.” Roberts, supra note 27, at 638-39.
284. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2013) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable accom-
modation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process
with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should
identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable
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prohibition on requesting or requiring information related to dis-
ability could hinder accommodation because although the employee
could voluntarily provide information, her employer would be un-
able to lawfully ask follow-up questions. Moreover, Title VII also
requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees’ religious
beliefs or practices.285 If an employer is too restricted in its ability to
ask about an employee’s religion, it could likewise impede the
employer’s ability to obtain information that would allow it to make
the adjustments necessary to accommodate. Consequently, privacy
law designed to prevent discrimination must incorporate accommo-
dation exceptions.
Diversity initiatives, another kind of positive differential treat-
ment associated with antisubordination, could likewise be under-
mined if privacy protections are too restrictive. Title VII’s EEOC
regulations currently permit employers to engage in affirmative
action “to correct the effects of prior discriminatory practices” and
encourage such action in certain contexts, like training and
recruiting practices.286 “Because of historic restrictions by employ-
ers, labor organizations, and others, there are circumstances in
which the available pool, particularly of qualified minorities and
women, for employment or promotional opportunities is artificially
limited.”287 As with accommodation, information related to protected
status is necessary to further an employer’s diversity goals.
GINA’s robust privacy protection provides a case study in over-
protection. In the context of genetics, as in the context of disabil-
ity, difference is the norm. Aside from identical twins, no two people
share the same genetic information. However, the prohibition on
requesting genetic information is not context specific. Even if an
employer wishes to obtain genetic information to promote antidis-
accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”).
285. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”) (emphasis
added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(1) (“Section 701(j) makes it an unlawful employment
practice under section 703(a)(1) for an employer to fail to reasonably accommodate the
religious practices of an employee or prospective employee, unless the employer demonstrates
that accommodation would result in undue hardship on the conduct of its business.”).
286. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3(b).
287. Id. § 1608.3(c).
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crimination goals, such as providing accommodations or promoting
diversity, it cannot do so by law. Imagine a factory worker with a
genetic proclivity for carpal tunnel syndrome. This person could
perhaps benefit from a longer workday with more frequent breaks
to avoid repetitive stress on her wrists, effectively a genetic-
information accommodation.288 GINA’s regulations explicitly permit
employers to request genetic information when accommodating a
disability.289 However, employers cannot make similar requests to
accommodate an employee’s genetic difference because of the robust
nature of GINA’s privacy provision.290
Whereas exceptions for Title II of GINA and the accompanying
EEOC regulations permit voluntary disclosure in the context of
wellness programs and do not penalize employers for inadvertent
acquisition, GINA at present does not include a reasonable
accommodation provision.291 Consequently, GINA does not relax its
privacy protection to allow the kind of back and forth necessary to
arrive at a mutually beneficial outcome for employee and employ-
er. The same issue arises in the context of genetic diversity.
Although the notion of genetic diversity initiatives may read like
288. A comparison to disability rights law further illuminates this point. Bradley Areheart
has explained that a person with an invisible disability who requires an accommodation must
decide between privacy (that is, keeping her disability a secret) and antidiscrimination (that
is, requesting an accommodation). Areheart, supra note 115, at 714-15.
289. See 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8. This line may not be as clear as it seems. For example, plain-
tiffs have alleged GINA violations after employers obtained information for accommodations
purposes but then released it to unnecessary third parties. See Bell v. PSS World Med., Inc.,
No. 3:12-CV-381-J-99MMH-JRK, 2012 WL 6761660, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2012).
290. To be clear, GINA does not stop employees from giving their employers genetic
information. As described in Part II, the statute exempts the employer from liability under
just those conditions. However, following a voluntary disclosure, if the employer wishes to
acquire additional genetic information with the goal of accommodating the employee on the
basis of her genetic difference, the employer cannot make that request. For a more lengthy
account of the benefits of a reasonable accommodation requirement in GINA, see Roberts,
supra note 27, at 642-45.
291. Current law only requires accommodation for manifested impairments under the
ADA. The EEOC regulations for Title I explain that the ADA only requires employers to
provide accommodations to individuals who are “regarded as” having a disability, only those
people who presently have a substantially limiting impairment or who have a record of a
substantially limiting impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(e) (“A covered entity is required,
absent undue hardship, to provide a reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified
individual who meets the definition of disability under the ‘actual disability’ prong ... or
‘record of ’ prong ... but is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual
who meets the definition of disability solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong.”).
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science fiction, as genetic technology continues to advance,292 and as
people begin to develop senses of genetic identity, the need for
promoting genetic diversity could very well soon follow. If Congress
were to amend Title VII to mirror GINA exactly, an employer that
wishes to have a racially diverse work force would be prohibited
from requesting information related to race. Thus, privacy
protections to further antidiscrimination goals should also permit
exceptions when the employer wishes to obtain the relevant
information to promote diversity.
Moreover, privacy by its very nature hinders disclosure. When
information is widely understood as private, people may be unwill-
ing to share it, thereby stifling their expression. To be clear, this
concern is normative, not legal. Use of privacy law to thwart
discrimination could swathe the relevant status with a shroud of
secrecy, or even worse, imply that the status is shameful and
therefore worth hiding. An individual who becomes aware that her
employer cannot request certain information could conclude that
such information is “private,” making it inappropriate for disclosure.
Thus, privacy protections might signal that the relevant informa-
tion is best kept to oneself. Similarly, risk-averse employers may
discourage—or outright ban—all disclosures, even voluntary ones
on the part of the individual employee, in an attempt to avoid
potential liability. However, both externally imposed (by the
employer) and internally imposed (by the person herself) constraints
on disclosure could undermine certain key antidiscrimination
objectives.
Encouraging people to keep information related to protected
status private could generate both personally and socially undesir-
able outcomes. With respect to traditional antidiscrimination cate-
gories, such as race and sex, individuals have historically been en-
couraged by society to obscure their identity status in various ways.
One way that members of historically disadvantaged groups may
292. Next-generation sequencing refers to a new scientific approach that allows more rapid,
comprehensive DNA sequencing. This technology has transformed genetic science and
simultaneously generated serious legal and ethical concerns. See generally, PRESIDENTIAL
COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICS, supra note 186. The first baby screened using next-gen
technology was born in the United Kingdom in July 2013. Ben Hirschler, First Test-Tube Baby
Born After New, Cheaper Genome Screening, REUTERS (July 7, 2013, 7:12 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2013/07/07/us-science-fertility-screening-idUSBRE9660LI20130707 [http://
perma.cc/BLP3-EEBG].
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conform to majoritarian norms and culture is through the process
of passing. Randall Kennedy has described the process of passing as
“a deception that enables a person to adopt certain roles or identi-
ties from which he would be barred by prevailing social standards
in the absence of his misleading conduct.”293 The paradigmatic
example of racial passing in the United States occurs when a black
individual intentionally presents herself as white to reap the social
benefits associated with whiteness.294 However, people may pass
anytime a particular attribute is not readily apparent, including
ethnicity, religion, age, or disability. According to Kennedy, one
cannot pass unknowingly, “passing requires that a person be self-
consciously engaged in concealment.”295 Although Kennedy himself
does not adopt an absolute position regarding the rightness (or
wrongness) of passing,296 he does acknowledge the potentially
harmful effect that practice can have on identity, explaining that
passing results in assimilation into majoritarian culture and, by
consequence, a dilution of the relevant identity group’s solidarity.297 
Moreover, individuals may face pressure to conform to majoritari-
an norms even when that identity status is known to outsiders, a
phenomenon known as “covering.” An individual covers her identity
status when she claims that status yet makes special efforts to
downplay it.298 For example, a person may self-identify as a member
of a particular racial group but intentionally not adopt a style of
dress, speech pattern, or other behaviors typically associated with
that group. That individual is covering her race. Kenji Yoshino
famously applied the concept of covering to the incentives faced by
gays to assimilate into straight culture, arguing that coerced
assimilation constitutes an antidiscrimination harm.299 He then
expanded his discussion to explore how both racial minorities and
women face similar pressures to downplay certain aspects of their
identity in the workplace.300 
293. Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2001).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1146.
296. Id. at 1188.
297. See id. at 1187-88 (explaining the arguments against modern-day passing).
298. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772-74 (2002) (explaining Erving
Goffman’s theory).
299. See id. at 783-875.
300. See id. at 875-924.
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Incentives to pass and to cover entrench majoritarian norms,
thereby holding the potential to undermine the expression of
identity and the importance of valuing diversity. Hence, insofar as
protecting privacy to stop discrimination encourages individuals to
pass or to cover, it could be socially damaging by devaluing non-
majoritarian identities and undermining diversity. Advocates of
privacy to prevent discrimination must be careful that the resulting
protections do not add the power of law to the already potentially
stifling incentives for nonmajoritarian people to assimilate. As will
be discussed further, including clear antisubordination-oriented
elements could also mitigate this concern.301
Although norms against disclosure may be damaging when
associated with existing identity groups, it may appear to be less of
a risk in the context of genetic information. Genetic information, of
course, does not currently form the foundation of widely recognized
identity groups.302 However, that may soon change. Studies show
that individuals who have taken genetic tests incorporate the re-
sults of those tests into their self-concept.303 Depending on the value
the individual places on her genetic information and the extent to
which it becomes relevant to her sense of self, genetic information
could thereby constitute the basis of a new identity category.304
Take, for example, actress Angelina Jolie’s recent revelation that
she carries a BRCA-1 mutation, which greatly raises her chances of
developing breast and ovarian cancer, and her consequent decisions
to undergo preventative surgeries.305 Several women with risk
profiles similar to Jolie’s lauded her decisions both to undergo
genetic testing and to take preventive measures with respect to her
health.306 This strong sense of solidarity indicates that these women
301. See infra Part III.D.1.
302. Roberts, supra note 27, at 623-24 (discussing the absence of a strong sense of genetic
identity).
303. ROBERT L. KLITZMAN, AM I MY GENES? CONFRONTING FATE & FAMILY SECRETS IN THE
AGE OF GENETIC TESTING 169-182 (2012) (discussing the incorporation of genetic information
into an individual’s self-concept and the formation of genetic identity).
304. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 27, at 623-24 (discussing the possibility of genetic
identity).
305. To read Jolie’s story in her own words, see Angelina Jolie, Editorial, My Medical
Choice, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at A25. For Jolie’s story about her decision to have
preventative surgery to remove her ovaries and fallopian tubes, see Angelina Jolie, Editorial,
Diary of a Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2015, at A23.
306. See, e.g., Lidia Dinkova, Opening Up the Conversation About BRCA, MIAMI HERALD,
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relate to Jolie and consider themselves members of a particular
population: women with a heightened genetic risk for breast and
ovarian cancer. Should privacy norms surrounding genetic informa-
tion grow too strong, individuals who could have a positive impact,
like Jolie, may choose not to share their genetic profiles. In essence,
they might be encouraged to engage in genetic passing or genetic
covering, practices that could be problematic for the same reasons
associated with their more traditional counterparts.
A robust norm against disclosing genetic information could also
have practical implications beyond the identity concerns explored
above. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers in France
were able to trace more than half of the French cases of juvenile
glaucoma to one fifteenth-century couple who lived in a village in
Brittany.307 By combing through meticulous lineage records, the
research team identified the names of individuals descended from
that family, who might be at heightened risk.308 Early detection and
treatment are particularly important for cases of juvenile glaucoma
because, although medically effective interventions exist, by the
time an individual becomes symptomatic permanent eye damage
has likely already occurred.309 The researchers hoped they could use
their findings to alert the at-risk individuals, only to discover that
the strong privacy laws in France prevented such disclosures.310 The
French glaucoma study presents another example of how strong
privacy laws and norms could hinder socially useful information
sharing in the context of genetic information.
To sum up, strong privacy protections could impede useful
disclosures both with respect to traditional antidiscrimination cate-
gories and to genetic information. This possibility presents a sig-
nificant drawback to employing privacy law as antidiscrimination
law. Consequently, lawmakers who opt to use this strategy must be
careful to allow positive differential treatment, like for accommoda-
tion and diversity purposes, as well as not to unduly restrict
individual autonomy by encouraging people to pass or cover.
June 30, 2013, at 6HH.
307. Alexander Dorozynski, Privacy Rules Blindside French Glaucoma Effort, 252 SCI. 369,
369 (1991).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 369-70.
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2. Legislative and Judicial Reluctance
Another potential obstacle to using privacy to further antidis-
crimination lies in the legislative and judicial reluctance to provide
or enforce robust independent privacy protections. The legislature
in California enacted the California Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act (CalGINA) in 2011, a law that expanded the
prohibition against genetic information discrimination to life insur-
ance, state programs, housing and mortgage lending, public accom-
modations, and emergency medical services.311 However, California
failed to pass the Genetic Information Privacy Act, S.B. 1267 in
2012.312 The proposed law, which would have protected genetic
information under the state’s constitutional right to privacy, sought
to prohibit obtaining, analyzing, retaining, or disclosing genetic
information absent written authorization from the person in
question.313 The bill included both civil and criminal penalties314 and
carved out exceptions for law enforcement, healthcare provision, and
newborn screening.315 Although S.B. 1267 died in committee, its
sponsor introduced a very similar bill in the next legislative term.316
S.B. 222 likewise did not make it out of committee in 2014.317 Those
bills targeted intrinsic privacy harms on the basis of genetic infor-
mation.
The failure of S.B. 1267 and S.B. 222 implies that legislators
may be reluctant to pass broad independent protections for privacy.
311. On January 1, 2012, the California Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(CalGINA) took effect. California Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 2011 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 261 (West).
312. See Bill Seeking Greater Genetic Privacy Protection Reintroduced in California,
GENOMEWEB DAILY NEWS (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.genomeweb.com/bill-seeking-greater-
genetic-privacy-protection-reintroduced-california [http://perma.cc/5B8T-4GRZ].
313. S.B. 1267, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. § 56.19(a) (Cal. 2012) (“Genetic information is
protected by the right of privacy pursuant to Article I of Section I of the California
Constitution, and ... shall not be obtained, analyzed, retained, or disclosed without the written
authorization of the individual to whom the information pertains.”).
314. Id. § 56.19(b)-(f).
315. Id. § 56.19(i)(1)-(5).
316. See S.B. 222, 2012-2013 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://perma.cc/97LX-
RPJA; see also Bill Seeking Greater Genetic Privacy Protection Reintroduced in California,
supra note 312.
317. For more information about the bill’s history, see Complete Bill History,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_222_bill_20140203_history.html
[http://perma.cc/U746-D2VA] (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
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Given the success of CalGINA, a statute that extended the scope of
the protections against genetic information discrimination well
beyond the federal level,318 this insight is particularly salient. The
California example tells us that, whereas legislatures may be wil-
ling to provide broad antidiscrimination protection, they may not be
similarly amenable to providing broad privacy protection, perhaps
because of the intangible nature of the associated harm. If this
explanation is true, it could hinder the use of privacy law to prevent
discrimination. In addition to legislative reticence, the purely digni-
tary nature of simple privacy violations may present an obstacle to
litigants because, like legislators, judges could be unsympathetic.
As outlined in Part I, intrinsic privacy harms are, by definition,
intangible, making them a challenging basis for a legal remedy.319
An unflattering read of protections against intrinsic privacy
violations holds that the only people who stand to benefit from these
types of safeguards are those individuals who have something
shameful they wish to hide. Given the perceived relationship
between privacy and shame, characterizing information related to
protected status as “private” could possibly communicate the
message that one should be self-conscious or embarrassed about
one’s status.320 However, shame is not the only reason to safeguard
privacy.321 Recall from Part I that autonomy is the primary norm
driving privacy protections.322 Arguably, then, regardless of what is
revealed, the impacted party experiences shame, not because of the
content of the revelation but rather because of the loss of control
318. CalGINA extends protection against genetic-information discrimination to a number
of areas beyond GINA’s current scope. Bill Seeking Greater Genetic Privacy Protection Rein-
troduced in California, supra note 312. CalGINA also offers greater remedies than available
under Title II. Compare Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
233, § 207, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6 (2012)) (capping
damages at $50,000 to $300,000 in accordance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act), with
California Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 261 (West)
(providing unlimited monetary damages pursuant to the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act).
319. Daniel Solove notes that Warren and Brandeis themselves “were concerned that such
dignitary harms might strike some as too ethereal to be legally cognizable.” Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 20, at 487.
320. See Gross, supra note 26, at 176.
321. Id. at 177.
322. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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over personal information.323 Should legislators choose to adopt
privacy protections to prevent discrimination, they must be careful
not to imply there is something shameful about the nature of the
protected information.
Regardless of whether protection implies shame, some scholars
have attacked protecting privacy generally. Richard Epstein writes
that “the plea for privacy is often ... for the right to misrepresent
one’s self to the rest of the world.”324 We can therefore understand
the right to privacy as effectively the right to lie, more often than
not, by omission. Yet Epstein acknowledges that a right to privacy
is not completely devoid of value. Epstein notes that such a right
“[i]n and of itself ... may not be a bad thing.”325 In fact, he believes
that privacy can serve the essential social functions explored in the
preceding Parts:
We are certainly not obligated to disclose all of our embarrassing
past to persons in ordinary social conversations; and it is
certainly acceptable to use long sleeves to cover an ugly scar.
White lies are part of the glue that makes human interaction
possible without shame and loss of face. Strictly speaking, people
may be deceived, but they are rarely hurt.326
Privacy facilitates social interaction and engagement by giving
people control over their personal information. Yet it is worth noting
that Epstein’s support of privacy is actually quite limited. While he
would not want us to be forced to share “all” of our past secrets in
“ordinary social conversations,” he leaves the door open for whether
it may be appropriate to share at least some of those secrets under
specific circumstances.327 The goal of avoiding “shame and loss of
face” may simply not warrant protection if the potential disclosure
is meaningful enough.328
323. Gross, supra note 26, at 177.
324. Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses
to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994). But see Richard A. Posner, The Right of
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 399-401 (1978).
325. Epstein, supra note 324, at 12.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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Because the pain caused by intrinsic privacy violations is not
physical or pecuniary but psychological,329 one of privacy’s strengths
is also one of its weaknesses. Although potential litigants may be
able to more readily prove their claims under section 202(b) because
that provision does not require litigants to establish discriminatory
intent, claims for violations of section 202(b) require no associated
adverse employment action, making the harm at stake purely
dignitary in nature.330 Courts have notoriously struggled with how
to provide adequate remedies for privacy violations absent another
associated harm.331 Even if claimants enjoy privacy protection, judg-
es may be hesitant to provide them with meaningful relief if they
suffer no other associated harm.
D. Antidiscrimination as a Solution
Two of the major drawbacks of using privacy provisions to achieve
antidiscrimination goals are (1) their potential to impede both
personally and socially beneficial disclosures, such as those as-
sociated with accommodation, diversity, personal identity, or con-
sciousnessraising, and (2) the hesitance that courts and legislatures
have exhibited regarding dignitary violations absent other kinds of
harms. Yet just as privacy can do work for antidiscrimination, anti-
discrimination can do work for privacy in addressing these concerns.
1. Antisubordination to Facilitate Positive Disclosures
While privacy works extremely well under an anticlassification
paradigm, using privacy to combat discrimination could be undesir-
able for antisubordination. As explained, the antisubordination
vision of antidiscrimination supports, and at times even requires,
access to information regarding protected status.332 Remember that
antisubordination holds that the proper goal of antidiscrimination
329. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
330. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 202(b), 122
Stat. 881, 907-08 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2012)).
331. See, e.g., Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the Anticom-
mons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899, 911 (2003); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104
NW. U. L. REV. 477, 505 (2010).
332. See supra Part I.C.
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law should be to elevate the social status of historically subjugated
groups. With respect to genetic information, which currently has no
widely associated social class, an antisubordination approach would
seek to preempt genetic disadvantage.333 Yet how can society accom-
modate or value difference without some knowledge of the existence
and nature of that difference? It cannot. Disclosure is, as a result,
central to the antisubordination vision of the antidiscrimination
principle.334
If the governing norms behind privacy protections are ones of
antidiscrimination, and lawmakers adopt an antisubordination
approach, this strategy would support disclosure when done to
thwart disadvantage. Returning to a previous example, the
individual with a genetic proclivity for carpal tunnel syndrome
would feel free to request an accommodation from the employer and
the employer could then, as with the ADA, request additional
information to honor that request.335 Similarly, antisubordination
would also urge us to value diversity.336 Efforts to accommodate or
promote diversity would indicate a regard for nonmajoritarian
statuses, thereby decreasing pressures to cover or assimilate.
Consequently, identity-related disclosures, like being able to claim
a particular protected status, and consciousness-raising disclosures
that are designed to create solidarity and promote acceptance would
likewise be desirable. If legislators imbue a privacy provision with
an antisubordination purpose, it would permit, or perhaps even
encourage, disclosure under certain circumstances.
People would feel free to express information about their
protected status on their own terms. Entities like employers could
only request that information with the express purpose of furthering
antisubordination goals. Using privacy law to combat discrimination
could thereby capture the best of both worlds. Individuals could
maintain autonomy by deciding how and when to disclose informa-
tion related to protected status, and potential discriminators would
be unable to ask about protected status unless the inquiry were
333. See supra Part II.B. It would do so with all of the typical tools of antisubordination,
prohibitions on both intended and unintended discrimination and the use of positive
differential treatment. See supra Part I.C.
334. Areheart, supra note 115, at 710-11.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 283-85.
336. See Rothstein, supra note 202, at 455-60.
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explicitly designed to accommodate or to cultivate diversity, thereby
facilitating equality and fairness by limiting opportunities for future
discrimination.
Empowering individuals to disclose their nonmajoritarian stat-
uses serves important antisubordination goals. Allowing (or even
encouraging) positive disclosures, while essential, does create a
small additional problem. Specifically, individuals could strategi-
cally use positive disclosures to capitalize on existing majoritarian
norms. For example, imagine a job candidate intentionally referenc-
ing her church and religious beliefs in an interview with a Catholic
employer. Because it would be too challenging for an instrument as
blunt as the law to differentiate between genuine expressions of
identity and strategic disclosures, this kind of intentional gaming
must regrettably go untouched.
2. Antidiscrimination Harms as Extrinsic Privacy Harms
Legislators and judges might be more willing to safeguard privacy
if they are aware of the potential extrinsic privacy harms (that is,
discrimination) in addition to the intrinsic ones. As recently demon-
strated in California, lawmakers appear more open to prohibiting
discrimination than to protecting privacy.337 Tying privacy protec-
tions to antidiscrimination might offer a useful strategy to counter
this hesitance to safeguard privacy independently. It could be more
appealing to legislatures, or courts, to associate privacy protections
with antidiscrimination harms.
Contrast the California experience with GINA itself. Congress
opted to protect genetic privacy by including the prohibition on re-
questing, requiring, or purchasing genetic information in Title II.338
Congress was willing to protect privacy to stop discrimination. Had
supporters of the Genetic Information Privacy Act included those
protections within CalGINA, they would likely have had greater
success. Similarly, if judges understood certain kinds of privacy vi-
olations as related to discrimination, they might be more open to
awarding greater remedies. Hence, advocates of privacy could frame
337. See supra notes 311-17 and accompanying text.
338. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, tit. II, 122
Stat. 881, 905 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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their arguments in terms of antidiscrimination to contextualize the
kinds of harms that might come from unauthorized disclosures.
Safeguarding privacy thereby shifts from simply protecting a purely
dignitary “right to lie” to a means for bypassing tangible future
harm.
GINA already protects employees from requests for their genetic
information.339 However, other employment discrimination statutes
could benefit from bans on requesting, requiring, or purchasing
information related to protected status. Title VII again provides a
useful case study. As described above, not all protected statuses
under Title VII are immediately apparent.340 Real-world examples
exist of employers learning previously unknown information about
their employees and then using that information to discriminate.341
Consequently, a privacy protection could be useful to combat
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, ethnicity, and
religion, in addition to genetic information. Tethering privacy to
antidiscrimination thus simultaneously bypasses discrimination
and respects personal autonomy. An explicit antidiscrimination
purpose can address the weaknesses inherent in the privacy law,
thereby leading to more comprehensive protection for genetic in-
formation, as well as for other protected statuses. Privacy law has
much to offer antidiscrimination and antidiscrimination has much
to offer privacy law.
E. A Final Caveat
This Article has described the work that privacy law can do in
ending discrimination. This proposal, however, is an imperfect
solution, responding to an imperfect world. In many cases, the
discriminator must first identify the object of discrimination as
different and attach a particular value to that difference.342 Exploit-
ing the privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis intervenes at the
differentiation stage. By obscuring certain ways in which an em-
ployee may be different from her coworkers, this strategy under-
mines the process of discrimination. However, this approach does
339. See supra Part II.A.
340. See supra Part III.A.
341. See supra Part III.A.
342. See supra Part I.B.2.
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accept the present reality that differentiation may lead to value
assignment and, by consequence, discrimination. My desire to
foreclose the possibility of eventual discriminatory conduct does not
indicate a belief that the first step in this process is the only
appropriate place for intervention. It may be the least desirable in
some ways.
In particular, using privacy law to bypass discrimination is a
shortcut. It allows us to preempt discriminatory treatment without
thinking deeply about the meaning of difference and the values we
may attach to it. Relying on privacy law as antidiscrimination law
allows the existing power structures and status hierarchies to
remain intact.343 Privacy law fails to push us to understand why we
value one attribute over another. Alternatively, instead of interven-
ing at the first step, lawmakers could also attempt to intervene at
the second stage in the process, value assigning. Christine Jolls and
Cass Sunstein call this goal “debiasing.”344 Of course, the primary
objection to focusing on value assignment is that the government
has no business policing the preferences and internal thought pro-
cesses of its citizens.345 While no one questions the ability of legisla-
tures to target discriminatory conduct, targeting discriminatory
beliefs—even if the goal of targeting those beliefs is to eliminate the
corresponding behaviors—raises serious concerns.346
Interestingly enough, Jolls and Sunstein have also maintained
that ordinary antidiscrimination protections, which attack the third
and final step in the process of discrimination, can also have debias-
ing effects by increasing the number of historically disadvantaged
people in the workforce, thereby creating more opportunities to
debunk the existing stereotypes.347 Perhaps the same could be argu-
ed for using privacy law as antidiscrimination law, but such an
outcome would admittedly be a byproduct of the legislation, not its
primary objective. Privacy law is therefore a second best. It makes
discrimination practically impossible, but does not attack the under-
343. Minow warns against the dangers of this possibility, “I think we must think seriously
about difference. Otherwise, its meanings—embedded in unstated norms, institutional
practices, and unspoken prejudices—will operate without examination or justification.”
MINOW, supra note 69, at 374.
344. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 973.
345. Id. at 992.
346. Id. at 993.
347. Id. at 980-85.
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lying norms that lead to discrimination in the first place. Yet in the
meantime, as we continue to dismantle the beliefs and social prac-
tices that have created and perpetuated inequality, privacy law
offers a simple and straightforward tool for bypassing discrimina-
tion.
              
* * * 
     
Privacy law carries significant advantages for furthering the goals
of antidiscrimination. It avoids the need to establish discriminatory
intent and it preempts discrimination, possibly reducing the scope
of harm the affected individual experiences. However, strong pri-
vacy protections could discourage useful disclosures, and the general
apprehension surrounding independent legal protection for pure
privacy violations may undermine the utility of such an approach.
Antidiscrimination itself thankfully provides a remedy for privacy
law’s potential shortcomings. For one, the antisubordination par-
adigm could guide lawmakers when evaluating which disclosures
might be useful both for genetic information and other protected
categories, such as to allow accommodation or to promote diversity
and solidarity. Further, antidiscrimination lends mass to pure pri-
vacy law, which is often associated with dignitary harms. By under-
standing prohibitions on requesting, requiring, or purchasing pro-
tected information as designed to preempt discriminatory actions,
what appears at first blush to protect against a harm that is solely
dignitary in nature becomes associated with another substantive
kind of legal wrong. Legislators and judges may be more inclined to
draft and to enforce, respectively, privacy protections when they are
linked to the potential for antidiscrimination harms. The pri-
vacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis is just that—a true symbiosis
running in both directions.
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CONCLUSION
Privacy law can do the work of antidiscrimination. By restricting
access to information about protected status, privacy legislation can
promote fairness and equality by denying potential discriminators
access to the very information they need to discriminate. Hence,
although privacy law and antidiscrimination law have typically
been considered separate and distinct areas of legal protection, they
can also act symbiotically. GINA broke new ground when it included
a prohibition on requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic
information in its employment discrimination title. Yet this novel
protection does more than safeguard against invasions of genetic
privacy. GINA’s privacy provision can be understood in explicitly
antidiscrimination terms, as a real-world example of the privacy/
antidiscrimination symbiosis.
Despite privacy law’s strong benefits as an alternative antidis-
crimination paradigm, norms against disclosure can at times do
more harm than good. Additionally, a general disdain surrounding
independent privacy violations on the part of legislators or judges
could undermine the practical impact of these legal protections.
Fortunately, antidiscrimination itself offers the solution. As noted,
an antisubordination approach to privacy provides useful insight
into when disclosures are desirable. Antisubordination could avoid
the potential chilling effects of privacy law and the resulting inabil-
ity to accommodate or consider diversity, as well as the pressures to
cover or assimilate. Moreover, tying privacy protections to antidis-
crimination goals allows legislators and judges to understand an
alternate class of harms that may result from unauthorized disclo-
sures and could, as a result, make them more amenable to providing
protection and relief. In other words, invocations of antidiscrimina-
tion could help proponents of privacy laws further their cause.
The alliance of privacy and antidiscrimination has powerful im-
plications for the future of antidiscrimination law. Congress and
state legislatures ought to consider whether bans on requesting,
requiring, or purchasing information related to other protected cate-
gories, such as race, sex, ethnicity, national origin, religion, and age,
should be similarly prohibited. Preventing employers from inquiring
into protected status generally could bypass the discrimination that
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might result if an employer discovers previously unknown informa-
tion about an employee.
The privacy/antidiscrimination symbiosis illustrates how lawmak-
ers can use privacy to prevent discrimination. This observation adds
a previously under-utilized weapon to the antidiscrimination arse-
nal. Yet like any fledgling armament, privacy law carries with it
certain dangers. Although advocates of antidiscrimination should be
willing to deploy this alternative tool, they should likewise remain
aware of its drawbacks and never lose sight of their true purpose: to
create a more just, equitable world.
